LIBYA

While the signing of a permanent ceasefire agreement between Libya’s warring factions has raised hopes of a gradual return to stability and full resumption of oil production, its implementation faces a range of obstacles. The signing of the ceasefire agreement will likely forestall further direct conflict in the immediate term. In the longer term, the durability of the ceasefire agreement is doubtful. Specifically, it remains unclear to what extent the various international actors engaged in Libya will back the agreement, given that it challenges several of their key interests. Without sufficient additional incentives, foreign forces in Libya are unlikely to withdraw. For as long as these forces remain on the ground, the durability of the ceasefire will be in large part dependent on actors external to Libya. On the commercial front, in the short-term the oil and gas sector is likely to remain vulnerable to intermittent disruptions stemming from military-enforced shutdowns and blockades of individual sites.

• The 2020 Geneva peace agreement between military representatives from the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) potentially marks a turning point in the Libyan conflict. The ceasefire deal stipulates a range of conditions, including the withdrawal of all forces from front-line areas, the immediate suspension of foreign military training for both factions, and the departure from Libya of all foreign fighters and mercenaries. However, the agreement is significantly lacking in detail and specificity. While the UN intends that the finer points will be worked out during follow-up negotiations and through the establishment of sub-committees, there is considerable room for disputes and back-tracking based on differing interpretations.
• Political infighting may ultimately undermine the ceasefire deal. The GNA in particular faces a considerable challenge in unifying the west to support the agreement amidst widespread distrust of Haftar, which has intensified following the recent emergence of evidence of alleged LNA atrocities following Haftar’s forces withdrawal from Tripoli. That Turkey, France, Egypt. and Russia have all continued to show signs that they intend to press forward with their own mediation processes in competition with the UN-administered framework is also discouraging. Turkish military support to the GNA has resulted in sustained gains. Specifically, the provision of increased numbers of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs has given the GNA an enhanced close air support capability as well as the ability to repeatedly target LNA supply lines.
• The oil and gas sector is likely to remain vulnerable to intermittent disruptions stemming from military-enforced shut-downs and blockades of individual sites. There is also little certainty that the LNA’s wider oil blockade will not be reinstated in the near future, given that the Haftar-Maiteeq agreement has been viewed extremely critically in the west and there is resistance inside the GNA to implementing Haftar’s proposed revenue-sharing mechanism. Should Haftar again feel sufficiently threatened or marginalised, the condition that revenues “will not be used to support terrorism” provides ample room for him to justify reinstating the blockade by labelling any GNA-aligned militias as ‘terrorists.’