Egypt « ExxAfrica

Articles Tagged with: Egypt

July 26, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: RUSSIA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

EXX Africa explores Russia’s growing influence in Africa. We look at the drivers of this foreign policy shift, the locations of interest, and the implications for traditional players across the continent.

Read the PDF article here.

At the end of this year, in October 2019, Russia will host its very first Russia-Africa Summit, which will bring together more than 50 African leaders in Sochi. While Russian influence across the continent is nothing new, as the former Soviet Union enjoyed extensive support among many African nations throughout the Cold War, there has been a notable shift in its focus over the past half-decade. We explore the nature of this shift and the strategic objectives behind Russia’s engagements with select countries. We further look at how Russia fares against other global powers in this latest ‘scramble’.

Background

Russian influence across the continent is not unprecedented. From 1960 until the end of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union supported liberation movements in Algeria, Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Morocco and South Africa, among others. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, these relations faded. Indeed, throughout the next decade, Africa experienced a so-called ‘third wave of democratisation’ during which Vladimir Putin showed limited interest in Africa.

This outlook changed significantly after 2014. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, relations with the West reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The US and EU responded to Russian expansionist policies in Eastern Europe by implementing sanctions against the regime, while both sides of the dispute engaged in a military build-up.

In response to actions from the West, Russia amended its foreign policy to establish strategic ties outside of the West and to insulate its economy against ongoing sanctions. As a part of this, Russia established new economic and security ties with South Asia, the Middle East, South America and indeed, Africa.

The Africa pivot

YEVGENY PRIGOZHIN

According to leaked documents obtained by the Dossier Centre, a London-based investigative unit, Russia’s pivot towards the continent typically involves a deal in which it offers some level of political or security support to African leaders in return for various concessions, such as in mining, oil and gas, arms or infrastructure contracts. Through these deals, Russia also establishes close personal ties with various heads of state and upcoming leaders, ensuring longevity to its plan.

The man reportedly driving this shift to Africa is known as Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman and close ally of Putin who is believed to be a funder of Wagner Group: a private military contractor with a presence in Africa. According to the leaked documents, Prigozhin has identified various countries with which Russia is seeking to bolster relations through political and economic ties, police training, media and humanitarian projects, and “rivalry with France”. Each country is ranked out of five in terms of priority with five being the highest level, and one the lowest.

The following countries are identified as part of this shift, according to the leaked documents:

― Rank five: Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Madagascar

― Rank four: Libya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa

― Rank three: South Sudan

― Rank two: the DRC, Chad and Zambia

― Countries cited where Russia “plans to work”: Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and Mali

― Countries cited “where cooperation is possible”: Ethiopia

― Countries cited as “traditionally supportive”: Egypt

We explore the nature of these relations and the impact on Western interests in some of these countries of interest.

Central African Republic – Rank Five

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN CAR

Russian influence in the CAR – a former French colony – failed to garner much attention until July 2018 when it was reported that three Russian journalists had been killed around 180km from the capital, Bangui, while on an assignment focused on investigating the activities of Wagner Group in the country. By the end of the year, Russia’s involvement had made its way into a UN Experts Report.

In the midst of a protracted armed conflict that had been ongoing since 2013, it emerged that President Faustin-Archange Touadéra sought out Russian assistance on the side-lines of a UN General Assembly meeting in 2017 to help bring about peace and get armed groups around the negotiating table. Russia responded by providing the national army with training and equipment and provided the president with security advice and personal protection.

To date, this has included: the free delivery of thousands of smalls arms to equip local law enforcement and two local battalions totalling 1,300 men; the deployment of Valery Zakharov (a former member of Russian intelligence services) as the top security advisor to Touadéra; the deployment of over 170 servicemen to train local security services; the deployment of an additional 30 servicemen to join the local UN peacekeeping mission; and plans to open a local office in the country.

Rich in natural resources – such as gold, diamonds and uranium – Russia is suspected to be shoring up support with Touadéra to secure these contracts. Indeed, reports have emerged of the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries guarding valuable gold and diamond mining operations in the country. This includes the large Ndassima gold mine that is alleged to have been taken over by Russian interests funnelled through a locally registered company known as Lobaye Invest. Ndassima was previously owned by a Canadian company before falling into the hands of Seleka rebels.

In addition to winning contracts in the extractives sector, the leaked documents further reveal that Russia plans to “replace national assembly representatives and [the] foreign minister who are orientated towards France” and “own [a] radio station and two print publications”. These objectives were partially achieved with the establishment of a new government this year and the opening of Radio Lengo Songo, which is funded by Lobaye Invest and the Russian embassy, last year.

France’s response to Russian meddling in its former colony has been vociferous. Following the free delivery of arms to the CAR the French Defence Minister noted, “I am not sure that this presence and the actions deployed by Moscow… help to stabilize the country”. In November 2018, in a show of force, France announced that it would be delivering its own arms to the CAR as well as aid to the value of USD 27.4 million.

South Africa – Rank Four

PRESIDENT PUTIN OF RUSSIA AND PRESIDENT RAMAPHOSA OF SOUTH AFRICA

Ranked as a level four, recent Russian interests in South Africa have revolved around entering into political consultations with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party ahead of the May 2019 general elections, monitoring of public-political social processes, and creating a new media – according to the leaked documents. This plan was formed as part of Putin’s strategy to support incumbents in office and to work against “pro-Western” parties and movements.

Just prior to the elections in May, in which doubt began to emerge as to whether the ANC would garner above 50 percent of the vote, a local investigation by the Daily Maverick revealed that these plans were underway. It emerged that entities linked to Prigozhin had devised to “create a disinformation campaign that favoured the ANC and put out a propaganda action against the opposition DA [Democratic Alliance] and EFF [Economic Freedom Fighters].” As a part of this strategy, Russia reportedly deployed a small team of political analysts to South Africa to work within a research outfit that would influence public rhetoric, degenerate and disseminate video content, coordinate with a “loyal pool of journalists” and produce “pro-ANC videos”.

While subsequent reports revealed that the initiative was not very effective and that there was no disinformation campaign, the attempt nevertheless points to the intent my Russia to meddle in African politics to ensure a favourable outcome.

Moreover, the investigation by the Daily Maverick further pointed to various business interests in South Africa that Russia planned to pursue under the leadership of Prigozhin. These include the supply of ammunitions and short-barrelled weapons to a South African company, the acquisition of stakes in a local industrial packaging company and various infrastructure projects, particularly in Johannesburg.

Beyond South Africa, the report revealed interests in Zimbabwe (a rank four country), particularly under the new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Here, Russia is looking to secure access to gold mining, tantalite, copper and chromium deposits – it is already developing one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum group metals – and the establishment of a military industrial complex.

South Sudan – Rank Three

Russia’s relationship with South Sudan cannot be explored without acknowledging the close ties it enjoys with its neighbour, Sudan (a rank five country). Putin had long enjoyed a close relationship with former Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir who reportedly even offered Russia a naval base at the Red Sea in return for support for his government, particularly in light of mounting protests. While Al Bashir was eventually removed in 2019, Putin still enjoys relations with the transitional military council in power and will likely play an active role in the 2020 elections.

South Sudan is crucial to Sudan, and therefore Russia. While Sudan lost 75 percent of its proven oil reserves after South Sudan gained independence in 2011, it nevertheless retains the infrastructure required to bring South Sudan’s oil to market and, as such, continued flow between the two states is necessary. As South Sudan has looked to open up its hydrocarbons sector to potential investors in light of its peace deal in 2018, Russia has emerged as a top contender.

In late 2018, a delegation from South Sudan along with officials from the government-owned Nile Petroleum Company travelled to Russia to a sign an MoU with a Russian oil company, Zarubezhneft, to explore some of its blocks open for licensing. The officials also signed two other MoUs with Russian oil producer, Gazprom Neft and energy company, Rosneft, to develop a geological map of the country’s minerals. In addition to these oil exploration deals, Russia is also reportedly working to establish a refinery for South Sudanese oil back in Sudan.

Furthermore, it is alleged that as Russia’s commercial relationship with South Sudan continues to expand, Russia may soon shift to promoting its military interests in the country. In this scenario, much like in the CAR, its security forces are expected to be deployed to guard Russian interests – such as oil blocks – and train local forces.

Democratic Republic of Congo – Rank Two

DRC PRESIDENT FELIX TSHISEKEDI

Russia has recently hedged its bets by backing newly-elected President Félix Tshisekedi following the controversial general elections that took place at the end of 2018. While many Western countries – including France and Belgium – supported opposition concerns that Tshisekedi had struck a deal with former President Joseph Kabila ahead of the vote, Russia not only sided with the new president but – along with China and South Africa – also blocked the UN from taking any meaningful action regarding the vote.

This action is unsurprising given that Russia had engaged in discussions with Kabila and his supporters about reviving a 1999 agreement on military cooperation in 2018, and had reportedly cultivated a relationship with Tshisekedi ahead of the vote. Rich in natural resources, Russia is likely looking to gain access to new concessions whilst promoting an anti-Western ideology in the country – a stance previously undertaken by Kabila and likely to be pursued under Tshisekedi.

INSIGHT

While Russian engagement with Africa has certainly grown, with trade and investment climbing by 185 percent between 2005 and 2015, it lags behind the initiatives of other major powers, such the US, the EU, and China. Each one of these countries has established economic and military ties across the continent and has their own programmes in this regard.

While US investment in Africa has barely risen since 2010, in June 2019, it launched a new Prosper Africa policy to reverse this trend and, indeed, counter both Chinese and Russian influence across the continent. The US also has a vast military presence in Africa, which includes 34 sites with high concentrations in the north, west and the Horn of Africa.

The EU and Africa also have extensive ties. Economically, 41 African states have signed Economic Partnership Agreements with the bloc and there is even talk of a continent-to-continent free trade agreement. Military, France has a large presence across the continent, particularly in the Sahel and the Maghreb. As part of Operation Barkhane alone, France has deployed over 3,000 personnel to the region in its largest overseas operation.

Lastly, China remains the top contender (economically speaking) with it being the continent’s leading trading partner. The total volume of two-way trade between China in Africa currently exceeds USD 200 billion while investment from China to Africa doubled between 2010 and 2016. As a show of further commitment to the continent, in September 2018, President Xi Jinping pledged an additional USD 60 billion in broad and diverse financing. Its key focus in this regard has been its Belt and Road Initiative.

In comparison to these other actors, Russian influence in Africa appears relatively weak and poses a limited threat to more established players. However, instead of competing head to head in terms of military or economic might, Russia is likely playing a more subtle game in which it establishes itself in less popular destinations, sows seeds of discontent with the West, helps up prop up long-term leaders and secures access to natural resources.

SEE COUNTRY OUTLOOK: SOUTH-AFRICA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SOUTH-SUDAN, SUDAN, MADAGASCAR, CHAD, ZAMBIA, GUINEA, UGANDA, EQUATORIAL-GUINEA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, ETHIOPIA, EGYPT, MALI, LIBYA, ZIMBABWE

May 29, 2019

SPECIAL FEATURE: SUPPLY CHAIN RISK IN AFRICA

Transport logistics are a vital and promising sector for business in Africa. However, traversing land, sea, and air routes across the continent comes with a plethora of political and security risks. EXX Africa explores the key concerns in this regard, their manifestation, impact, and outlook.

Read the PDF article here.

Doing business in Africa is beset with a number of political and security risks. Recent research by Aon reveals that 70 percent of countries in sub Saharan African are currently at risk from strikes, riots, and other types of civil unrest while 25 percent are at risk from sabotage and terrorism. Although government assets are most frequently targeted during such events, these risks ultimately affect the viability and profitability of private entities and investments as well.

The latest Emerging Markets Logistics Index, which ranks 50 emerging economies across the world, places these concerns in the transport logistics sector. Agility Logistics produces this index. Rankings are pulled from data from institutions such as the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank, the UN, and the WEF, among others, and is supported by a survey of trade and logistics industry professionals. Findings from the 2018 Index reveal that many of the top supply chain risks in sub Saharan Africa relate to political and economic concerns, with industry professionals citing corruption (23 percent), government instability (18.3 percent), terrorism (9 percent), and piracy (4.1 percent) as major risks. In North Africa, terrorism (43.8 percent) and government instability (19.9 percent) together represent almost two thirds of the primary concerns.

A similar long-term study by Willis Towers Watson echoes these findings. Its 2016 Transportation Risk Index, compiled from data and insights derived from 350 interviews with executives in the sector, noted that the number one long-term (up to ten years) megatrend for logistics across the continent concerned geopolitical instability and regulatory uncertainty.

Such political and security risks tend to affect transport logistics across the continent in three ways: border closures or delays, the targeting of state assets, or the targeting of private assets. We explore each of these manifestations, identifying their major trends, impact and outlook below.

Border closures and delays

RWANDA – UGANDA BORDER CLOSURE

Government and geopolitical instability frequently result in the planned or unexpected closure of land, sea and air routes, affecting the movement of goods and services. Such closures most often arise as a result of a change in government – whether by democratic or undemocratic means – or as a result of bilateral tensions between neighbours.

Election periods pose one of the primary threats in this regard. Even votes deemed free and fair, and organised by democratically elected governments can cause disruption. During the General Elections in Nigeria in February 2019, for example, the government announced the closure of all borders and implemented various restrictions on vehicular movements for the voting weekend. A similar elections-related border closure took place in December 2018 when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) closed its borders with its nine neighbours as it held its long-awaited polls.

Unexpected changes of power, such as via an insurrection, coup, revolution or rebellion, further results in risks to the logistics sector and induces high levels of uncertainty. During the successful removal of President Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan in April 2011, following weeks of anti-government protests, the transitional military council closed the country’s airspace for 24 hours as well as all border crossings until further notice.

Unsuccessful attempts at regime change can also result in panic, as witnessed in January 2019 when Gabon suddenly closed its border with Cameroon following an attempted coup against President Ali Bongo. All cross-border trade ground to a halt forcing local businesses to divert their goods to Equatorial Guinea.

Poor bilateral relations can further limit the flow of goods and services. While there are some known long-standing tensions between neighbours that have resulted in border closures, such as between Morocco and Algeria (ongoing for 25 years) and Ethiopia and Eritrea (borders have closed again despite a peace deal in July 2018), emergent socio-political developments can cause abrupt stoppages to cross-border commerce as well. In February 2019, Rwanda unilaterally decided to close its busiest border with Uganda over mutual allegations of threats to national security. The decision not only affected bilateral trade but impacted trade to Burundi, the DRC and Zambia as well. One month later, borders were again closed in Southern Africa, this time between South Africa and Mozambique following xenophobic attacks in Kwa-Zulu Natal province. During this incident, a crowd of around 200-300 Mozambicans barricaded the N4 and began targeting trucks with South African license plates.

Targeting of state assets

Beyond broader political threats and the closure of borders, the logistics sector is often impacted by security-related incidents in which non-state actors target key state infrastructure assets. Such incidents may emerge during acts of militancy, labour unrest or sabotage.

The strategic importance of a country’s infrastructure – particularly its ports – often renders these assets prime targets for militant attacks and activity. This has been demonstrated repeatedly in conflict zones over the past 12 months, with attacks reported against sea and air ports in Somaliland (Bosaso Port), Somalia (Mogadishu International Airport), Libya (Ras Lanuf and Es Sider Ports, and Mitiga International Airport), Niger (Diffa Airport), and Mali (Sevare Airport). Militants may even attempt to seize such assets for political leverage. In March 2019 in the Central African Republic, a local rebel group stationed at the border post with Cameroon blocked cargo to impede commercial traffic in an attempt to force the government to include them in the newly formed government.

The economic importance of logistical infrastructure further incentivises established worker unions to target such assets during labour disputes and negotiations. In this instance however, disruptive events are not limited to conflict zones but can be found across all countries, including the major economies. In a 2019 survey on supply chain risk management in South Africa, all 20 participants identified socio economic factors, such as labour unrest, as a key source of vulnerability. South Africa has also been impacted by frequent incidents of sabotage within the logistics sector, with arson and derailment attacks having recently been carried out against both its passenger and cargo rail services.

Targeting of private entities

WEST AFRICA PIRATES

Political and security risks may also affect private commercial entities and their assets directly as well. One of the primary security threats in this regard is posed by piracy. While this threat is location and sector specific, its impact is significant – particularly considering that 90 percent of African imports and exports are moved by sea. According to the 2018 Oceans Beyond Piracy report, in East Africa alone, the annual cost of maritime piracy was estimated at USD 1.4 billion in 2017 (down from USD 7 billion in 2010) while in West Africa it was estimated at USD 818 million (up from USD 719.6 million in 2015).

Most concerning, according to the latest statistics released by the International Maritime Bureau, the threat from piracy is increasing in West Africa. Since 2014, there have been approximately 250 actual and attempted attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, with a 70 percent increase in incidents being reported between 2017 and 2018 alone. This surge is expected to result in associated rises in the cost of maritime business, particularly with regard to insurance. In 2017, the total costs of additional premiums incurred by ships transiting the Gulf was calculated at USD 18.5 million. Moreover, it was estimated that 35 percent of all ships now take out Kidnap & Ransom insurance, totalling USD 20.7 million.

Companies operating in the transport logistics sector are also frequently targeted by corrupt individuals. The sector remains particularly vulnerable to corruption given its close engagement with customs officials who are often underpaid and look to increase their wages through opportunistic facilitation payments. Extensive red tape and delays further amplifies this risk: according to the African Development Bank, the average customs transaction across the continent could involve 30-40 different parties. In addition to increasing commercial operating costs and affecting intraregional and international trade, such corruption at ports of entry and exit frequently facilities a range of illicit activities as well, such as the smuggling of people and goods, and tax evasion.

INSIGHT

Despite these challenges, there remain sound opportunities for transport logistics in Africa. Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, and Angola all featured within the Emerging Markets Top 50 Logistics Index last year.

Looking more closely at the data, Egypt and Ethiopia were identified as having made significant strides in the logistics sector. The improvement in business conditions in Egypt, including the reduction in business costs associated with crime, violence and terrorism, has been identified as one of the primary reasons for it jumping six places in the index last year – the most of any country. Similarly, Ethiopia’s goal to become a low-cost manufacturing and textiles hub along with the opening of Africa’s largest cargo terminal in Addis Ababa has attracted much attention. However, ongoing security concerns, especially the threats posed from ethnic conflicts and terrorism along border areas with Somalia and Kenya, were identified as setbacks.

In another promising development, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, and Kenya were identified within the pool of countries that have the most potential to grow as logistics markets within the next five years. However, sub Saharan Africa’s two largest economies – South Africa and Nigeria – each fell down the index, with Nigeria falling seven spots. Both countries were nevertheless identified as turning a corner, particularly with regard to corruption and political instability and uncertainty in 2019.

As demonstrated above, supply chain risks vary wildly from country to country across Africa. From isolated events that cause single points of impact (such as a militant attack), to ongoing events that generate a localised yet sustained impact (such as strikes), to all-encompassing events (such as a coup), companies in the transport logistics sector are advised to stay abreast of political and security dynamics to navigate and forecast their threat environment. In addition, transport logistics should consider using political risk insurance to insulate their operations against disruption.

SEE COUNTRY OUTLOOK: ALL COUNTRIES

May 21, 2019

EGYPT: DESPITE SECURITY CONCERNS, THE OVERALL RISK OUTLOOK IS REMARKABLY OPTIMISTIC

The terrorism threat to Egypt is being overstated due to sporadic and relatively low capability, yet high-profile, attacks on foreign tourists. The country’s overall risk outlook is remarkably positive as a result of enhanced political stability, IMF-mandated fiscal prudence, and cheap loans from the Gulf, as well as a boom in gas export revenues. Once the IMF programme terminates later this year, concerns over inflation and Egypt’s debt sustainability will have subsided.

Read the PDF article here.

On 19 May, a rudimentary improvised explosive device (IED) containing nails and pieces of metal was detonated remotely on the perimeter of the Grand Egyptian Museum that is being built close to the Giza pyramids. The explosion targeted a tourist bus and injured at least 12 people, mostly South African tourists. Four Egyptians in a nearby car were also injured by broken glass. The location of the attack is not far from the site of a roadside blast that hit another tourist bus in December.

The following day, Egyptian security forces killed 12 suspected Islamist militants in the 6th of October and Al Shorouk districts of Egypt’s capital Cairo. The targets of the operation were reportedly members of the militant group Hasm, which the government claims is a wing of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and were planning a series of attacks in the country. However, there has been no confirmation that these individuals were behind the attack in Gizah.

This type of counter-terrorism operations usually follows high-profile militant attacks. For example, in December 2018, a day after the deadly bombing of a Vietnamese tourist bus in Gizah, authorities announced that its forces had killed 40 people in three separate incidents. There is often no correlation between the terrorist acts and the subsequent military actions, which local activists claim are extrajudicial killings.

Country terrorism profile

The bus attack targeting South African tourists, which happened a few kilometres from the pyramids, on the outskirts of Cairo, is the second deadly attack against foreign tourists in Egypt so far this year, after the January attack on the Vietnamese bus. Before then, the last deadly attack on foreign tourists in Egypt was in July 2017, when two Germans were stabbed to death in the Red Sea resort of Hurghada. It is still too early to speculate on whether there is a definite increase in the terrorism threat in Gizah for several reasons.

Local sources in the security sector report that the Egyptian branch of the Islamic State – Wilayat Sinai – is widely seen as most likely to be behind the attack on the Vietnamese tour bus. Here the IED used was far more sophisticated than the latest device used in the attack on the South African bus. This opens speculation that the latest incident might be a crude copy-cat style attack, although there is no evidence to support this theory.

It also appears that the threat posed by Wilayat Sinai in both Cairo and throughout Egypt may be at its lowest. In addition to several of the group’s leaders being neutralised or detained, factionalism has also emerged within the movement, with a breakaway faction of Wilayat Sinai pledging their fidelity to al-Qaeda and establishing operations in Egypt’s Western Desert region. However, the most damaging development to the trajectory of Wilayat Sinai’s insurgent operations in Egypt has undoubtedly been the launch of Comprehensive Operation – Sinai 2018. was initiated in February 2018 as a broad-based military operation to neutralise all terrorist elements operating in Egypt. While predominantly focusing on Wilayat Sinai’s operational strongholds in the Sinai Peninsula, counterterrorism operations were also launched in the country’s Nile Valley and Western Desert regions.

BUS ATTACK IN GIZAH, EGYPT

Regardless, the series of bus attacks is indicative of the heightened threat of terrorism in Egypt and specifically that targeting the country’s tourism sector. The bomb attacks have also demonstrated the operational capacity of the Wilayat Sinai organisation and highlighted the group’s capabilities to execute mass casualty attacks outside of its base in Egypt’s North Sinai governorate. Nevertheless, it is important not to overexaggerate the extent of the terror threat in Egypt and its commercial implications, especially for the tourism sector, as we assessed following the last Gizah attack in January (See EGYPT: TERRORISM IS NOT ‘DYING’ AS COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS ARE WITHDRAWN).

Still, the suspension of Comprehensive Operation – Sinai 2018 last year and a withdrawal of security assets from terrorism-embattled regions could provide Islamist militants groups such as Wilayat Sinai a chance to recuperate and recalibrate their armed insurgency. This is mostly due to areas outside of Egypt’s jurisdiction – notably the Gaza Strip – providing enduring safe havens and a resource pool for Egyptian extremists. The Gizah bus attack is indicative of a resurgent terrorism threat in Egypt. It also demonstrates the intent by Egyptian militant groups to stage bold attacks in order to curb the country’s crucial tourism sector.

Although the Islamic State’s presence remains highest in north Sinai, the group will likely continue to extend its operations in “mainland” Egypt in the six-month outlook, either by providing logistical and tactical support to existing militant groups or by establishing its own cells. In this scenario, assassinations, sophisticated attacks with vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), and suicide bombers would target government buildings, foreign targets, police posts, major hotels, and assets or personnel associated with countries that are part of the military coalition against the Islamic State. In Sinai, tourist resorts in the south of the peninsula, such as Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba, remain aspirational targets for the group. While major hotels are likely to be well-protected, public areas where tourists congregate, or smaller hotels along the southern coast, are more vulnerable to IED attacks.

Shoring up political authority

EGYPT PRESIDENT ABDEL FATAH EL SISI

The supposedly high security threat also serves as a reason for the security forces to establish greater authority over the state. A vote in parliament on 16 April backed a constitutional change to allow Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el Sisi, a former Field Marshal and 2013 military coup leader, to stay in power until 2030, while extending powers to the country’s military. The constitutional amendment process was engineered by the president’s son, Mahmoud, who occupies a high-level position in the powerful General Intelligence Service (GIS), or Mukhabarat. Other close confidants of Sisi have also been involved in the constitutional amendment planning, including GIS head General Abbas Kamel, who previously served as the director of Sisi’s office at the presidency, and the current chief presidential aide General Mohsen Abdel Naby.

By drawing in the GIS, Sisi has sought to make the presidency more independent of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which remains the post-coup military junta centre of power in Egypt. However, by uniting the various pro-Sisi political parties into the Nation’s Future Party, Sisi has also centralised presidential influence over parliament. Sisi’s eldest son, Mustafa, is a senior official in the Administrative Control Authority, which oversees state institutions and government ministries. Therefore, Sisi has also shored up his authority over Egypt’s massive public service.

A crucial aspect of the political consolidation is integrating the security services into the planned megaprojects that are underway in the country. Senior generals and SCAF officers have benefitted from the massive industrialisation projects engaged by the government, military affiliated companies, such as the Armed Forces Engineering Authority and the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, are favoured in tender processes and retain interests in infrastructure projects. These include the construction of the new capital Wadian, as well as major industrial construction projects in the Cairo conurbation of Badr City and the southern city of Beni Suef.

The involvement of Egypt’s influential military-industrial complex in economic development is key to retaining political stability, while also ensuring that the security sector remains capable to deal with security threats, such as unrest and terrorism. Since Sisi came to power, military spending has risen 215 percent. The Egyptian government has also increased collaboration with militaries from Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which has provided much of the financing for the megaprojects over past years. Meanwhile, Egypt is purchasing new military hardware and advanced weapons systems from multiple sources including the United States, France, Germany, and Russia. The government is now purchasing USD 6.6 billion in arms, making Egypt the third-largest arms importer in the world.

INSIGHT

There have been concerns that an increased spate of attacks on tourists would curb the sector’s revenues and drag down growth projections. The sector has been recovering after tourist numbers dropped in the wake of a 2011 uprising and the 2015 bombing of a Russian passenger jet. Despite the fresh attacks on tourists, the economic outlook for Egypt remains bright. Real GDP growth has averaged more than 5 percent since mid-2017 and is set to rise further in coming years as a result of increased natural gas production, the recovery of the tourism sector, and continued heavy investment in construction.

There are several other concerns that have been overstated in regards to Egypt’s economic outlook, namely debt sustainability and inflation. Much of Egypt’s recent growth is due to debt-financed infrastructure and industrialisation mega-projects. Foreign debt levels have doubled to more than USD 92 billion since 2015, which has raised further concerns over debt servicing and debt sustainability. Gross government debt now amounts to more than 77 percent of GDP. With the disbursement of the final tranche of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan this year, Egypt’s external debt will rise above USD 100 billion, equivalent to roughly 35 percent of GDP. However, the IMF’s disbursements are set to seize by the end of 2019, while many other loans are set to mature. Egypt is set to repay some USD 17 billion in loans from Gulf Arab partners this year alone. Such repayments should improve the country’s debt sustainability.

Loan repayment is being facilitated by rising revenues from the extractive sector, particularly gas exports from the Zohr field which is due to reach its long-term plateau production level of 3.2 billion cubic feet a day in the second half of 2019. Egypt is also due to receive the first gas supplies from Israel’s Tamar field via the East Mediterranean Gas pipeline. Further fields are being explored and developed, while multinational firms like Italy’s Eni seem willing to inject further capital investments into the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The expansion of Egypt’s naval forces is meant to protect the offshore gas assets, as well as the crucial Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping route.

Even when the USD 12 billion programme with the IMF ends in November, global bond investors who have flocked to Egypt’s capital markets in recent years will insist on fiscal prudence and tight monetary policy. This will become crucial as the government considers loosening fiscal and monetary policy once the current account deficit shrinks to below 2 percent next year due to a halt to imports of LNG and the steady recovery of the tourism sector – unless another high profile mass casualty attack takes place, as in 2015.

Because of the higher energy prices, the target of a primary fiscal surplus of 2 percent of GDP is likely to be met this year. Moreover, other economic indicators are also improving. Annual inflation is set to fall below 10 percent next year, from a high of 23 percent in 2017. The positive inflation outlook is a key indicator of improving political stability as the prospect of civil unrest and industrial action also subsides. Therefore, despite continuing threats of terrorism and concerns over political authoritarianism, Egypt’s political and economic outlook looks remarkably optimistic for the next few years.

SEE COUNTRY OUTLOOK: EGYPT

February 21, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: MANIPULATION OF ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFRICA

The misreporting of economic data and indicators is becoming increasingly apparent across some African countries. EXX Africa assesses the political motivations involved in the manipulation of economic statistics and the likely repercussions for investors and nascent continental trade agreements.

Read the PDF article here.

On 20 February, Tanzania’s National Bureau of Statistics rebased the country’s economy in order to recalculate growth in gross domestic product (GDP) over the past few years. The rebasing practice is commonplace and many African countries have rebased their economies over the past few years. Most notably, Nigeria overtook South Africa as Africa’s largest economy after a rebasing calculation in 2014 that almost doubled its GDP to more than USD 500 billion. The rebasing of Ghana’s economy last year meant that economy expanded by 24.6 percent in 2018.

However, the timing of rebasing economies is often politically motivated. In Tanzania’s case, the GDP rebasing shows a 3.8 percent expansion of the economy in the year that President John Magufuli came to power, even though there are signs that the economy has slowed since he was elected. Magufuli will seek re-election in 2020 based on a campaign pledge to broaden Tanzania’s economic growth through state-led interventionist policies.

In Zimbabwe, the statistics agency rebased some of its economic statistics last October in an unexpected move that the government said increased the nominal size of its struggling economy by more than 40 percent in 2018, which seems highly unrealistic given the country’s ongoing economic crisis. In neighbouring Zambia, the finance minister is planning to rebase the country’s GDP in 2019, which should see a sudden spike in economic growth this year, even though the economy is mired in debt and heavily impacted by falling export values.

Misreporting of national statistics

It is obvious, that the rebasing of a country’s GDP can be manipulated in order to serve political means, particularly to boost an incumbent in an election year or to deny an economic slowdown. Moreover, there have been numerous recent instances in which governments have failed to properly disclose publicly-guaranteed loans or have manufactured economic statistics, such as inflation, public debt, and GDP numbers.

This leads to a broader argument that the misreporting of statistics is commonplace in many African countries. In 2014, the Centre for Global Development (CGD) argued in a report that the misrepresentation of national statistics does not occur merely by accident or due to a lack of analytical capacity – at least not always – but rather that systematic biases in administrative data systems stem from the incentives of data producers to overstate development progress.

The CGD report argued that there are significant inaccuracies in the data being published by national and international agencies. These inaccuracies appear to be due in part to perverse incentives created by connecting data to financial incentives without checks and balances, and to competing priorities and differential funding associated with donor support. These inaccuracies, perverse incentives, and lack of functional independence mean that public and private investment decisions based on poor data can be deeply flawed, with major implications for well-being and public expenditure efficiency.

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

In this report, EXX Africa assesses a number of African countries where there are strong indications or past precedents of manipulation of economic and financial statistics. Our case studies vary from suspected manipulation of economic growth and inflation numbers to suit political ends, to a lack of disclosure of publicly guaranteed loans. These case studies do not provide a definitive list of countries that have misreported on indicators, but do illustrate a broader problem across African economies that is likely to have a major impact on foreign investors’ risk exposure and the future of hallmark African trade agreements.

TANZANIA – EXAGERATING GROWTH NUMBERS

Optimistic central bank forecasts show that Tanzania’s economy is picking up steam again. The rebasing of GDP also ‘magically’ increases the size of the country’s economy since current President Magufuli came to power. However, falling foreign direct investment, partial donor suspensions, and a tarnished investment reputation, as well as an unfolding scandal into massive public accounting discrepancies, paint a different picture.

Tanzania’s central bank projects that the country’s real GDP would grow by 7.2 percent in 2018 and 7.3 percent in 2019, supported by public investment, particularly the implementation of mega infrastructure projects. The economy has been growing at around 7 percent annually for the past decade, but slowed to 6.6 percent in 2017.

However, Tanzania has been struggling to secure financing to fund its Five-Year Development Plan. Local sources report that a lack of public spending and private sector concerns over policy uncertainty are actually curtailing growth, rather than boosting the economy. Investor confidence has collapsed, driven by the government’s disputes with investors. As a result, foreign investment has dropped by more than 30% since 2015 when President Magufuli was elected.

Moreover, subdued government revenue collection and delays in securing financing for projects have held back development spending and hurt economic growth. A sharp fall in lending to the private sector, prompted by high non-performing loans, point to a continued slowdown in growth. Additionally, the institutions of the Tanzanian state are weakening and increasingly exposing public revenue to embezzlement and corruption. Tanzania’s public finances are in poor shape and efforts to ensure effective financial oversight face mounting obstacles.

Our recent analysis and local intelligence contradicts the Tanzanian central bank’s forecast. Last year, the government imposed criminal sentences for organisations and individuals that contradicted Tanzania’s official statistics. We laid out the arguments contradicting Tanzania’s official forecasts in a recent briefing (See SPECIAL REPORT: IS TANZANIA MANIPULATING ITS ECONOMIC GROWTH FIGURES?).

ZAMBIA – LACK OF DEBT DISCLOSURE

The budget deficit and pace of debt-accumulation are more likely to be higher than previously forecast by the Zambian government. This follows a contentious revision of the 2017 fiscal deficit by the Zambian government to factor in capital expenditures that had not been properly recorded in the previous years’ financial statements. The IMF remains the foremost remedy for the ailing Zambian economy. Anchorage from the lender of last resort and the prospect of a restoration of macro-economic fundamentals should aid in narrowing the trust deficit, plugging the funding shortfall, and unlocking the desperately needed investment inflows.

The elevated debt has also placed interest payments under scrutiny, with concerns that they may tend towards 27 percent of revenue in 2019. Disconcertingly, with the local kwacha currency rapidly ceding to the USD and the outlook on the mainstay copper industry appearing highly speculative, there is the feeling that the worst is yet to come for the externally vulnerable market. Indeed, further bullishness from the US Federal Reserve Bank or tariffs on the commodity could see the Kwacha depreciate more, revenue streams dry-up, and foreign short-term payment requirements tread further into default territory as portended by recent ratings downgrades.

Beyond the arithmetic, the downgrades, and belated disclosure of the capital expenditure also call into question Zambia’s transparency amid ongoing suspicions that the country is withholding the disclosure of its true financial position. EXX Africa has taken a strong position on Zambia’s debt disclosure since early 2018, which conflicts with official government accounts.

Unofficial accounts say that total external and domestic debt stands at USD19 billion, accounting for over 90 percent of GDP. Since early 2018, Zambia has signed more than USD1 billion in new loans, indicating that total debt could now be nearing 100 percent of GDP. External debt could be as high as USD15.6 billion, while local debt seems almost incalculable given lack of clarity in lending by state-owned entities from local banks. The argument over debt calculations centres on whether undisbursed contracted loans (mostly Chinese project finance) should be counted (See ZAMBIA: AUTHORITARIANISM AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM GAIN FURTHER GROUND).

SUDAN – DENYING AN ECONOMIC CRISIS

The Sudanese economy is showing further deterioration as anti-government protests continue. The Sudanese pound has fallen to a record low on the black market, selling for 70 Sudanese pounds for cash transactions in recent weeks, as the gap with the official rate of 47.5 pounds continued to widen. The price of the dollar for cheque transactions stood at 83 pounds. Due to the lack of liquidity in the banks, US dollar carries two prices on the black market. The purchase price through checks is usually higher than the cash price.

The sudden depreciation over the past few weeks has been triggered by cash shortages following a run on the banks, as depositors fear the protests are gaining momentum since the opposition’s stated intent to unite against the embattled government. The Sudanese central bank sharply devalued the currency in early October to 47.5 pounds from 29 pounds to the dollar, and established a new system under which a group of banks and money changers set a daily rate. However, the official rate has barely moved, while the black market rate continues to depreciate against major currencies.

The economic crisis is being denied by the government, which recently released figures claiming that inflation was actually slowing. On 10 February, the state statistics agency said that Sudan’s inflation dropped to 43.45 percent in January year-on-year, from 72.94 percent in December led by slowing prices of food, beverages, and transport. Such figures have been widely ridiculed by both Sudanese and international economists as state propaganda.

The underlying economic and financial weaknesses remain in place and indicators such as cash shortages and currency depreciation suggest rampant inflation. A more likely forecast for January inflation would be around 85 percent, suggesting that Sudanese authorities are manipulating the statistical reports.

The most recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) report indicated that Sudan’s gross international reserves remained very low in 2017 at just USD 1.1 billion, equating to 1¾ months of import cover. Local sources report that reserves have fallen to a new low over the past three months and are fast depleting, posing sever risk of non-payment and default on loans. In EXX Africa’s most recent analysis, we considered that Sudan is firmly in debt distress and poses highest risk of debt unsustainability (See SUDAN: PROSPECT OF A ‘SUDANESE SPRING’ LOOMS AS OPPOSITION UNITES).

REPUBLIC OF CONGO – PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK WITH THE IMF

PRESIDENT DENIS SASSOU NGUESSO OF CONGO

A prevailing economic crisis in the Republic of Congo – manifest in the country’s debt accounting for 110 percent of its GDP – is increasing concerns regarding the country’s short-to-medium trajectory and President Sassou Nguesso’s longevity in implementing the necessary reforms to escape the malaise.

President Sassou Nguesso says his government is negotiating “on a basis of trust” with the IMF on the country’s financial problems. However, in 2017 the IMF accused Congo of having hidden part of its debt from the organisation by claiming it was 77 percent of GDP. According to the IMF’s own calculation, the ratio is 117 percent. Last year, French media claimed that the Congolese government had skirted requirements of the IMF through a financial contrivance created by French oil giant Total.

The IMF insists that the Congolese government first needs to restructure its USD 9.14 billion in debt, which at 117 percent of GDP the Fund deems unsustainable. The permitted debt threshold in the regional Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) organisation is 70 percent. Congo is seeking to restructure its debt with commodities trading houses after borrowing USD 2 billion from merchants. However, the bulk of its external debt is owed to Chinese entities.

Without regaining access to international financial institutions and markets, Congo faces an imminent cash-flow crisis. As it is, the government has had to resort to loans from China and short-term advances from its central bank. Rescheduling Congo’s debt will be extremely difficult because of the opacity and complexity of many of its deals, such as loans-for-oil with China. France and the US seem unwilling to deliver a bail-out, which increases the probability of a regional currency devaluation. The IMF seems adamant to avoid such a regional currency devaluation.

Foreign, especially French, companies also resist a devaluation as the pegged exchange rate has assured low inflation and a French guarantee of fixed-rate convertibility to the euro. When France devalued the CFA franc by 50 percent in 1994, the result was high inflation and outbreaks of popular unrest. Therefore, all CEMAC members are opposed to resorting to devaluation. However, France will be unwilling to lend money directly to distressed and unreformed economies such as Republic of Congo. This means that a currency devaluation may become the only option left to mitigate the debt crisis, unless the IMF intervenes

MOZAMBIQUE – THE ‘HIDDEN’ LOANS SAGA CONTINUES

In early January, Mozambique’s attorney general indicted 18 nationals for their involvement in fraud involving USD 2 billion in loans to state-owned companies. The indictment includes ‘charges of abuse of power, abuse of trust, swindling and money laundering.’ The country’s Parliament and attorney general’s sudden action demonstrate growing panic inside the Mozambique government and renewed pressure to deal with the three-year old scandal that prompted the IMF and foreign donors to cut off credit support in 2016, thus triggering a currency collapse and a debt crisis from which the country is still trying to recover.

Former Mozambique finance minister Manuel Chang was among those indicted. Chang, who denies wrongdoing, has been detained in neighbouring South Africa since 29 December in a case brought by US prosecutors related to the fraudulent loans. Four days after Chang’s arrest, three former Credit Suisse bankers – Andrew Pearse, Surjan Singh, and Deletina Subeva – were detained in London. A fifth accused, Jean Boustani was arrested in the US. Boustani is alleged to have negotiated a round of bribe and kickback payments by his company shipbuilder Privinvest in order to ensure Mozambique government approval for projects to develop a coastal protection system for Mozambique’s 2,470 km coastline.

One of the projects was contracted by Mozambican state-owned company ProIndicus, which solicited USD 622 million in loans from Credit Suisse and Russian state-owned bank VTB Capital. Another project, to build a fleet of tuna fishing vessels, was housed under state-owned company Ematum, which gained USD 850 million in financing from Credit Suisse and VTB Capital. A third project involving Privinvest, nominally to build a shipyard, provide additional naval vessels, and upgrade two existing facilities to service Proindicus and Ematum vessels, fell under a third state-owned company, Mozambique Asset Management (MAM), which secured loans worth USD 500 million.

All loans were secured by Mozambique government guarantees and began to default on repayments around 2017. According to the US indictment, large bribes and fraudulent payments were made to the various accused bankers and Mozambique government officials. All accused have so far denied the allegations.

However, Mozambique’s Attorney-General has said she will seek to have those charged in the US and elsewhere face justice in Mozambique. Further arrests are expected as a number of names in the US indictment have not been disclosed. EXX Africa was one of the first risk advisories in early 2016 to flag substantial undisclosed debts, which was eventually confirmed by the Mozambique government, subsequently prompting the IMF and foreign donors to cut off support, triggering a currency collapse, and a default on sovereign debt.

Mozambique’s government is currently seeking to restructure the loans and in November struck an initial agreement with the bulk of its creditors to restructure a USD 726.5 million Eurobond. The agreement includes extending maturities and sharing future revenue from offshore gas projects. The agreement confirms EXX Africa’s longstanding forecast that creditors would not seek punitive measures against Mozambique, but would rather restructure debts while leveraging gas revenues as collateral. The agreement is the first in a set of steps that will be required to restore Mozambique’s relations with creditors and international financial institutions, especially the IMF.

We recently also assessed the threat of the Mozambique debts scandal spilling over into Angola, which we continue to monitor (See SPECIAL FEATURE: FALL-OUT OVER MOZAMBIQUE DEBT SCANDAL RISKS SPILL-OVER INTO ANGOLA).

INSIGHT

Our analysis and economic forecasts show noticeable discrepancies between national official statistics and forecasts made by international agencies. The manipulation of economic data and the lack of full disclosure of publicly guaranteed loans will weigh on many African countries economic outlook this year and in the longer term.

In January, the IMF downgraded its 2019 sub-Saharan Africa growth projections from 3.8 percent to 3.5 percent. The World Bank is also rather subdued in its assessments, projecting that the sub-Saharan region will grow by no more than 3.4 percent this year. These projections are pushed downward by the muted economic recoveries in some of the continent’s largest economies, including Nigeria and South Africa. Meanwhile, the African Development Bank (AfDB) projects 4 percent growth across Africa, boosted by 4.4 percent growth in the North African region.

The highest growth levels will continue to be located in Anglophone East African countries, alongside the record growth tempo in Ethiopian. The fast developing Francophone West African countries, as well as Ghana, will provide a counter-balance on the other side of the continent, despite Nigeria’s more subdued growth rates. A post-election economic revamp could lift South Africa’s economy with beneficial effects for neighbouring states. In the meantime, the southern African region is expected to remain the continent’s worst performing economy.

A modest recovery in central Africa is unlikely to be sustained and is underpinned by IMF lending facilities to countries like Cameroon and Chad. The North African region is facing a decline as growth slows in Tunisia and remains stagnant in Algeria. Out of Africa’s five biggest economies, only Egypt will see growth rates of over 5 percent, again boosted by sizable loans from the IMF, World Bank and, Gulf states.

Debt sustainability will remain a key concern in Africa in 2019. The IMF warned last year that Africa’s debt-refinancing risks could be substantial over the next two years. The World Bank forecasts at least USD 5 billion in international debt redemptions in sub-Saharan economies this year and over USD 8 billion next year. These figures do not include domestic debt or substantial interest payments on both external and domestic debt.

Proper disclosure of debts and accurate and accountable reporting of economic and financial indicators will be crucial in determining African countries’ balance of payments and their longer term economic outlook. Investors will face higher risks in countries that are suspected of borrowing recklessly or manipulating economic indicators. Moreover, large trade deals, such as the nascent African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), could be spoiled if all participating countries do not accurately and transparently disclose all their financial obligations and economic growth numbers.

SEE COUNTRY OUTLOOK: ALL COUNTRIES

February 8, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: AFRICA ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IN 2019

Ahead of the expected ratification of the world’s largest free trade agreement, we assess the divergent economic trajectory on the African continent, as well as persistent concerns over debt sustainability and political risk in some countries.

February 5, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISK OUTLOOK FOR AFRICAN MINING

Investor optimism in African mining is gradually recovering as indicated by companies’ growing exploration budgets. However, some of the continent’s most important mining countries are frustrating investments through arbitrary changes to taxation regimes and imposing politically motivated fines.

Read the PDF article here.

The annual Mining Indaba conference in Cape Town, South Africa, takes place this year with fresh optimism after a four year slump. As interest in base metals begins to rebound and clean technologies boost demand for niche battery ingredients, mining exploration budgets are again increasing.

A recent report by S&P Global Market Intelligence found that mining companies spent USD 8.4 billion last year to explore new metal deposits. This marks a 15 percent rise on exploration spending in 2016. The report also forecast that exploration spending, excluding iron ore, could increase again by 20 percent in the next year. Mining company restructuring, consolidation, and high-profile mergers & acquisitions have also renewed interest in the sector. This bodes well for mining, which dominates foreign exchange earnings, tax earnings, employment, and GDP in many African countries.

However, African mining remains exposed to various significant challenges that will determine the sector’s operating risk climate in 2019. In this compact report, EXX Africa identifies the top risks facing the mining sector in Africa this year and puts the spotlight on some of the countries where political and security risks remain a substantial obstacle to investment.

EXX AFRICA RISK MAP FOR TOP TEN AFRICAN MINING COUNTRIES

EXX Africa has developed a unique risk scoring system for 54 African countries to compare and contrast the business operating climates across the continent. The country risk numeration is a crucial aspect of our analysis and forecasting methodology.

The below Risk Map identifies the top ten African mining countries in terms of mineral value and their respective risk outlook.

KEY POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISKS IN 2019

EXX Africa has identified the top risks facing the African mining sector in 2019. Almost all of the continent’s mining countries are affected by some form of political risk, which is further explained in the table below. The risk of taxation changes and contract frustration are by far the most prominent threats facing African mining, as outlined in the below Country Risk Spotlight section.

COUNTRY RISK SPOTLIGHT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

PRESIDENT FELIX TSHISEKEDI

There will be great pressure from mining companies on newly inaugurated President Félix Tshisekedi to amend the changes to the mining code that were implemented by former president Joseph Kabila. Indeed, a suspected power-sharing agreement between Kabila and Tshisekedi may dilute some of the former administration’s controversial policies, such as recent revisions in the mining code. The new code has increased royalties on cobalt – for which the DRC accounts for as much as 60 percent of the global supply – from 2 percent to 10 percent. Another significant amendment is the imposition of a 50 percent tax on windfall profits – defined as income that is realised when commodity prices increase by more than 25 percent of the figure denoted in a mining project’s bankable feasibility study. The mining companies, which are united in the ‘G7’ lobby group, are likely to apply new pressure on the government to ensure a review of the mining code revisions. We assess that mining companies’ concerns will be treated on a ‘case-by-case basis’.

See Country Outlook: Democratic Republic of Congo

ZAMBIA

NCHANGA MINE IN ZAMBIA

Zambia’s new tax regime is causing smelters to close and motivating mining companies to lay off workers and scrap investment plans. Worse is to come as a harmful new sales tax is due to take effect, while massive VAT rebate arrears are arbitrarily written off. The new tax code increases the country’s sliding scale for royalties of 4 to 6 percent by 1.5 percentage points, introduces a fourth tier rate at 10 percent when the copper price exceeds USD 7,500 per tonne, and makes royalties on minerals non-deductible for tax purposes. The response from the country’s mining sector has been highly critical. Mining companies complain that the higher mineral royalties will cease to be deductible from corporate income tax, thus hurting profitability. The impact of the new sales tax in April will be even more damaging for the mining sector. Industry group, the Chamber of Mines, has forecast that copper output will be flat this year and will start declining from 2020 as a result of the tax increases.

See Country Outlook: Zambia

TANZANIA

PRESIDENT JOHN MAGUFULI

President John Magufuli’s belligerent stance against foreign-owned firms operating in the country has been prominently manifested in the important mining sector. Most notably, Tanzania’s foremost gold mining entity, Acacia Mining, has been accused of evading tax over the past two decades. Consequently, Magufuli’s administration is seeking an estimated USD 190 billion in reparations from Acacia coffers, which have already been reduced following Tanzania’s imposition of an export ban of mineral concentrates – a key revenue generating activity for the mining firm. To put that figure into perspective, according to a report by Quartz, the amount represents approximately 40 times Acacia’s total revenue for 2016, nearly two centuries worth of revenue, and is roughly four times the size of Tanzania’s GDP for 2016. Precedent suggests that the legal measures may be an extension of the administration’s antagonism to foreign-owned firms, which is seemingly based on ideological leanings and a bid to extract the greatest possible financial concessions. Already, the erratic policy environment and growing authoritarianism have seen investors lose favour with Tanzania.

See Country Outlook: Tanzania

SOUTH AFRICA

PRESIDENT CYRIL RAMAPHOSA

Low expenditure on exploration indicates a troubled South African outlook for its mining sector. Central to investor concerns is the ongoing amendment of the mining legislation. The latest 2018 Mining Charter, despite being an improvement on previous versions, still raises considerable fears in relation to the carried interest of communities and employees, as well the distribution of black economic empowerment in specific percentages. The Charter allows mining companies who complied with a 26 percent empowerment stipulation in the previous version to enjoy empowered status even if their empowerment partner has exited their investment in the company. Investors are also concerned by rising costs of mining, as employee costs are rising above inflation. Bulk commodities such as iron ore, coal, manganese, and chrome are performing fairly well. However, precious metals like platinum are struggling. Investors will look to President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mineral Resources Minister Gwede Mantashe to restore some optimism about the future of the South African mining industry at the Mining Indaba.

See Country Outlook: South Africa

For further information contact info@exxafrica.com

January 24, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: THE COST OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN AFRICA

In this open access report, EXX Africa assesses the risk of internet shutdowns and online media restrictions in 2019, identifying the countries and operators most at risk of commercial disruption over the coming year.

Read the PDF article here.

So far in 2019, there have been internet shutdowns in at least five African countries, most prominently in Zimbabwe, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Cameroon, and Sudan. The rate of internet shutdowns has steadily increased over the past few years. According to global digital rights group Access Now, there were 21 shutdowns across Africa last year, up from 13 in 2017. Togo, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Egypt were among the countries implementing connectivity restrictions over the past two years. Cameroon’s Anglophone regions spent 230 days without internet access between January 2017 and March 2018.

In this open access special report, EXX Africa assesses the circumstances of recent internet shutdowns and identifies the African countries where the risk of outages will be highest over the course of 2019. This report also assesses the commercial and economic impact of internet shutdowns and the technical processes involved in shutting down an entire country’s connectivity.

PRECEDENT AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATION

ECONET WIRELESS SHOP IN HARARE, ZIMBABWE

While the practice of shutting down the internet is nothing new in Africa, the frequency and duration of shutdowns is steadily increasing. During the 2011 Arab Spring, North African governments regularly orchestrated shutdowns of connectivity and social media. Between 2015 and 2016, most instances of internet shutdowns occurred in West and Central Africa, in countries such as Mali, Chad, Gabon, Republic of Congo, and DRC. Since 2017, the practice has become more common in East Africa and southern Africa.

Governments usually implement these shutdowns through order requests sent to Internet Service Providers (ISP) or telecommunications operators, some of which may be government-owned. Shutdowns are easier to achieve in countries with few ISPs, unlike South Africa which has more than a hundred internet providers. The legal basis of such order requests lies in the contracts that ISPs sign with the communication regulator in each country. Usually, the regulator will have the power to order ISPs to restrict access to the internet or block social media apps at the regulator’s request.

The implementation of such order requests may create a total internet blackout (as most recently in Zimbabwe), or a restriction of access to certain websites, specifically social media (as in Cameroon), or the throttling of bandwidth (as in Sudan). Sometimes, domain name servers can be manipulated to send traffic away from intended destinations and toward servers controlled by the government. African governments have depended on tested practices in China to censor the internet. China is heavily involved in Africa’s internet, with state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE building internet backbones and other infrastructure for many African countries.

According to Access Now, the top three reasons given for internet shutdowns are public safety, stopping the spreading of illegal content, and national security. However, the legal justification for internet shutdowns is often vague or non-existent. Some governments have in the past denied issuing order requests to ISPs and have instead blamed technical problems, although ISPs are becoming more transparent in announcing government-ordered shutdowns. African governments increasingly link their orders to the necessity to protect the public order, particularly during election cycles or bouts of civil or military unrest.

While internet shutdowns may often violate domestic law, the international legal framework remains vague and relies on assurances protecting the right to freedom of expression or UN Guiding principles on Business and Human Rights. In 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council released a non-binding resolution condemning intentional disruption of internet access by governments. The resolution reaffirmed that ‘the same rights people have offline must also be protected online.’ However, the non-binding nature of the UN resolution, as well as entrenched internet censorship by countries such as China, has hampered attempts to implement broader prevention of internet shutdowns by governments.

In the absence of a clear framework governing the right to internet access, African governments will maintain their responsibility to protect the public order or to curb ‘fake news’. The below case studies are aimed at finding patterns on internet shutdowns in Africa and to assess the commercial impact of shutdowns.

‘TOTAL’ INTERNET SHUTDOWN IN ZIMBABWE

RIOT POLICE IN HARARE

On 21 January, the High Court said Zimbabwe’s government exceeded its mandate in ordering an internet blackout during recent civilian protests and ordered mobile operators to immediately and unconditionally resume full services. Zimbabwe’s biggest mobile phone operator Econet Wireless subsequently restored all internet and social media services. The sporadic internet blackout was ordered by Security Minister Owen Ncube on 15 January following the start of often violent protests against high fuel prices (See ZIMBABWE: POLITICAL DIVISIONS TAKE HOSTAGE AN ALREADY DISTRESSED ECONOMY).

Many people were left without access to social media platforms and email amid accusations that the government wanted to prevent images of its heavy-handedness from being broadcast around the world. Zimbabwe’s millions-strong diaspora raised the attention of the world to the internet blackout through various social media campaigns that were picked up by traditional media and triggered criticism from foreign governments, such as the UK.

While some internet users sought out virtual private networks (VPN) to bypass the controls, Zimbabwe’s shutdown did cut off crucial access to electronic bank deposits. The cash-strapped government uses such transfers to pay public sector workers, such as teachers, who were already on strike. Moreover, electronic remittances from the large Zimbabwean diaspora were also affected, further exacerbating Zimbabwe’s economic and financial crisis.

Some estimates assess that the shutdown will cost the country USD 5.7 million per day in direct economic costs. However, the widespread international condemnation of the Zimbabwean internet shutdown and the judicial ruling that the service order to ISPs was illegal does mitigate further risk of internet restrictions in 2019.

See Country Outlook: Zimbabwe

SOCIAL MEDIA RESTRICTIONS IN DRC ELECTION CYCLE

RIOT POLICE IN KINSHASA

The government of DRC President Joseph Kabila shut down internet and text messaging services ahead of and following disputed elections in December, claiming to preserve public order after ‘fictitious results’ were circulated on social media. The government warned of ‘chaos’ in case unofficial results were published on the internet or social media. Diplomats from the US, European Union, Canada, and Switzerland criticised the internet shutdown. The shutdown heightened fears of electoral fraud in presidential and legislative elections that were already marred by delays and violence (See DRC: TENSE PROTRACTED ELECTORAL CYCLE FINALLY COMES TO CONCLUSION).

Data leaked from the state’s electoral commission unambiguously contradicted the official results, triggering a dispute over the election results. The leaked data covers over 80 percent of the votes cast in the 30 December general election and closely matches voting data gathered independently by a parallel vote tabulation held by the Catholic bishops’ organisation, as well as three recent polls.

Internet provider Global and telecom operator Vodacom said that they had cut web access on government orders, although some NGOs claim that interruption to connectivity was being carried out at the discretion of commercial operators. Congolese authorities specifically targeted social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, YouTube, and Skype in order to hamper communication among protesters, while allowing businesses and banks to operate as usual. Nevertheless, disruption to mobile communications was widespread. The economic cost of a shutdown in DRC is estimated at USD3 million per day. The DRC’s restrictions on internet connectivity were similar to those that occurred in recent elections in Mali and Equatorial Guinea, as well as those that followed an attempted military coup in Gabon in early January.

See Country Outlook: DRC

TANZANIA CRACKS DOWN ON ONLINE MEDIA

TANZANIA PRESIDENT JOHN MAGUFULI

Some African countries have extended authoritarian practices to the online media sector by amending local legal frameworks. Tanzania’s government is a relevant case study since its implementation of the Electronic and Postal Communications Online Content Regulations Act in March 2018. The new law facilitates the government’s ongoing clamp-down on blogs, online content providers, and users alike with stringent regulatory requirements. These include a USD 924 licensing fee, the disclosure of ‘strategic’ information and the auditing of content by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), failing which transgressors may be subject to severe penalties.

After dealing with the online media sphere, the Tanzanian government has turned its attention to broadcast media, especially foreign-owned companies. Last year, the TCRA threatened to suspend the operating license for the Multichoice and Simbanet television companies. This action follows a string of contentious media-related regulatory measures, beginning with the Media Services Bill and Cybercrime Act. The Act criminalises ‘defamatory’ remarks and content that is deemed ‘seditious’ while authorising greater government oversight. This, in an apparent bid to regulate publicly accessible information so as to manage the narrative on a problematic political and economic agenda.

In targeting such entities with rigid operating requirements and colouring its persecution with nationalist rhetoric such as the ‘my country first initiative’, the government of President John Magufuli stands to gain both politically and economically. This, through increased revenue, royalties and penal payments as well as an appreciation in political stock in a country where economic nationalistic sentiments are still prevalent.

Various other African governments are implementing strict regulations on online media, which may set the tone for future crackdowns on internet connectivity and mobile telecommunications. Last year, Uganda’s government passed a new tax on social media, under which users must pay USD 0.05 a day to use popular platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. Both Tanzania and Uganda’s restrictive cybercrime and media laws were inspired by similar measures imposed in China.

Other than Tanzania and Uganda, countries where such authoritarian practices are most likely to be implemented over 2019 include Zambia, Zimbabwe, Togo, Senegal, DRC, Guinea, Algeria, and Egypt.

See Country Outlook: Tanzania

RISK OUTLOOK FOR INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN AFRICA IN 2019
In 2019, a number of countries are likely to impose full or partial internet shutdowns that will pose severe risk of contract frustration to operators, as well as broad economic disruption to investors. Some of these countries will hold highly contested elections this year and have already been identified in EXX Africa’s recent Africa Elections Special Report. More than half of Africa’s 54 countries will hold some form of election next year (See SPECIAL REPORT: TEN KEY AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN 2019).

Other countries, like Tanzania and Uganda, are implementing restrictive cybercrime and media laws to crack down on dissent and protests. EXX Africa has selected the ten countries where the probability of internet shutdowns or other forms of connectivity disruption is highest and where the risk of commercial disruption is most severe.

INSIGHT

A 2016 study by the Brookings Institution revealed that shutdowns drained USD 2.4 billion from the global economy between 2015 and 2016. A 2017 report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), estimated that sub-Saharan Africa lost up to USD 237 million to internet shutdowns since 2015. Given the rise in internet shutdowns and other forms of connectivity restrictions since then, particularly in Asia and Africa, this number is likely to be far higher in 2019.

The estimated cost of daily economic disruption varies from country to country: Ethiopia’s daily cost is USD 3.5 million, while Cameroon’s shutdown in Anglophone regions results in daily economic losses of USD 1.67 million. Since the shutdowns have become increasingly sophisticated, with governments targeting specific regions or communities, the broader economic costs may be mitigated. In Ethiopia 36 days of national and regional internet shutdowns between 2015 and 2017 cost the country USD 123 million, while Cameroon’s 93-day shutdown in Anglophone regions in 2017 made USD 38 million in total economic losses.

However, the cost would be different for economies with more developed media and IT sectors – a total shutdown in Kenya could potentially cost USD 6.3 million a day (CIPESA). As indicated in our 2019 risk ratings above, the threat of internet shutdowns in large and developed economies such as Kenya or Senegal, is rising. Shutdowns are no longer restricted to small and less developed economies, like those of Chad, Burundi, or DRC.

Activist groups Internet Society and NetBlocks have created a data-driven online tool, The Cost of Shutdown Tool (COST), to better measure the economic cost of internet shutdowns. Greater awareness of shutdowns in Africa, driven by media, governments, business, and NGOs, is expected to facilitate improved assessments of the economic costs, as well as enhanced risk mitigation strategies (like VPNs) to avoid commercial disruption in future.

January 16, 2019

AFRICA INVESTMENT RISK REPORT 2019

African markets that are opening up to structural reform and painful liberalisation will offer a more favourable investment climate over the coming year, while governments advocating state interventionism and currency manipulation will pose higher risk to foreign investors in 2019.

Read the PDF article here.

Every year, EXX Africa selects five countries as its favourite destinations for investment based on commercial interest among our clients and perceptible improvement in the country risk ratings. This selection is based on our local source intelligence, proprietary forecasting methodology, and quantitative risk scoring calculations. The selection showcases some of our key risk forecasts for the year ahead and flags potential new investment and trade opportunities.

Our forecasts take into account drivers of political, security, and economic risk, as well as other key trends that are likely to determine a country’s one-year risk trajectory. We do not base our forecasts on short-term impact incidents such as a failed coup in Gabon, riots in Zimbabwe, or a terrorist attack in Kenya. Rather, we assess the longer term socio-economic and political trends that drive such incidents in the first place.

We also identify those countries where we expect a significant deterioration in the business climate based on political, security, and economic risk drivers. Some countries picked in this year’s report match our selection last year, although there will be some inevitable surprises in the new line-up for EXX Africa winners and losers in 2019.

We wish you a prosperous New Year and trust you may continue to value our Africa risk intelligence.

2019 TOP FIVE INVESTMENT COUNTRIES

It may or may not be surprising that Africa’s largest economies, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, do not feature in our Top Five selection this year. These African economic giants were featured in previous years and all three countries have indeed made significant headway since the recessions of 2016. But hotly contested elections in South Africa and Nigeria have put policy-making on hold. Meanwhile Egypt is already reaping the benefits of relative political stability and steady economic recovery, despite re-emerging security threats. Cote d’Ivoire has also dropped out of our selection, as its economy faces new fiscal pressures and shifting political dynamics. Yet, Angola and Ghana remain firmly in our favourites’ list for this year, while we also take two bets on perhaps more ‘risky’ locations.

1) ETHIOPIA

ETHIOPIA COFFEE EXPORTS

Last year, Ethiopia was in our bottom five selection while the country was in the midst of violent ethnic unrest, hard currency shortages, and dwindling economic momentum. This year, the East African nation has shot up the rankings to become our favourite investment destination for 2019. The new administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has made a symbolic break from perceived past repression, graft, and public mismanagement. The ongoing political transition marks a shift in influence dynamics within powerful state-controlled holding companies and industrial-military conglomerates that have dominated the Ethiopian economy for over 30 years.

However, the success of the Ethiopian political transition will depend on the new government’s ability to seek compromise between established business and security interests and mounting calls for broad political and economic reform. Ongoing hard currency shortages, high inflation, and below target exports will remain key concerns at a time of continued fiscal expansion and dwindling economic momentum. The government seeks private sector participation and foreign investment to stimulate the economy, opening up significant new opportunities. World Bank growth forecasts indicate stabilisation in the next two years just below the 10 percent mark, which keeps Ethiopia among the globe’s top performers. While the business environment remains challenging, the reform-orientated policy agenda suggests potential improvements are likely. The country is also likely to use its expanding goodwill to acquire condition-free multilateral funding to replace expiring Chinese credit lines.

See Ethiopia Country Outlook

2) ANGOLA

OIL PRODUCTION OFFSHORE ANGOLA

As our favourite investment country of 2018, Angola remains in the Top Five selection this year. Angola’s economy will recover in 2019 on the prospect of rising oil production levels and IMF credit support. The IMF’s recent loan approval will add further legitimacy to the economic reformist trajectory that has been ongoing since President João Lourenço took office in September 2017. With greater observation of macroeconomic fundamentals and policy anchorage, market optimism on an already promising Angolan economy is likely to firm up. An Angolan real economy that is at the early stages of recovery will also benefit from the IMF’s presence via pro-market policies that help facilitate an environment conducive to investment and general expansion. There are immediate opportunities for the Angolan oil and gas sector such as the 2019 bid rounds for onshore and offshore blocks, as concrete steps to reverse the production downward trend.

Yet massive debts at state oil firm Sonangol and the banking sector’s political exposure remain key risks in the medium term. The country’s banks urgently require a round of consolidation to improve asset-quality and foreign-exchange risks. As public debt approaches 70% of gross domestic product, domestic credit is now crucial for state financing. While the new government’s highly popular anti-corruption and economic liberalisation platform is aimed at further diluting the former elite’s political and economic dominance, infrastructure projects will be at heightened risk of cancellation or review.

See Angola Country Outlook

3) GHANA

THE CITY OF ACCRA

Ghana will be one of the fastest growing economies in Africa in 2019. The country seeks to replace its dwindling foreign aid receipts as it consolidates its status as a lower-middle income economy. The government will seek to replace these sources of financing by improving revenue collection and raising new debt. With the termination of the IMF programme, Ghana will be able to access debt markets more freely to fill this void. Most of the recent growth is driven by increased output from Ghana’s oil fields, rather than from a more diversified base. The objective is seeking economic diversification through broad-based industrialisation, specifically agro-processing and light manufacturing.

However, a major challenge for Ghana remains its high level of indebtedness. With the debt ratio at around 70% of GDP, the government’s prudence with debt management remains key to the country’s economic prospects. The energy sector, in particular, is heavily burdened by debt, yet long-term energy sustainability is needed to meet growing demand and to facilitate economic growth. Nonetheless, given the apparent recovery and ongoing political stability, investor sentiments are unlikely to change. The absence of key electoral cycles for at least another two years also suggests that fiscal imprudence is unlikely during this period. That said, failure to narrow the deficit and public wage bill discipline, in addition to possible debt accumulation by an expansion-oriented Ghana, could stoke investor anxiety.

See Ghana Country Outlook

4) MAURITANIA

CITY OF NOUAKCHOTT, MAURITANIA

Our little surprise for this year’s Top Five – Mauritania is set to emerge as a new economic player in the West African region. Mauritania’s economy is making a strong performance on the back of investments in the mining sector. Iron ore exports and fishing dominate export revenue and the economy is set to grow over the next few years on the back of investments in the mining sector and important gas discoveries. The development of natural gas projects also augurs longer-term sustained growth. Rising export revenues and tax collections are improving the fiscal outlook, despite lingering concerns over debt servicing in the longer term. The current account is strengthening and foreign exchange levels are comfortable as iron ore prices rise. Initial concerns over foreign exchange speculation and inflation have mostly subsided. The IMF predicts a real GDP growth at 8.0%, 8.4% and 7.2%, respectively for 2018 to 2020, along with sizable policy adjustment and favourable commodity price developments.

The looming economic bonanza may still be spoiled by political instability. The upcoming 2019 elections are unlikely to be free and fair, while a heavy-handed security deployment is expected against opposition and activist demonstrations. While the political momentum is shifting in favour of the Islamists and Haratin ethnic group, the military is expected to act to preserve the status quo. As such, underlying political risks may emerge to frustrate contracts signed in the booming extractive sectors.

See Mauritania Country Outlook

5) MOZAMBIQUE

LNG EXPLORATION OFFSHORE MOZAMBIQUE

Perhaps we are calling it too early, but Mozambique has made significant headway since its economic and financial collapse in 2016. President Filipe Nyusi will have to meet three key objectives before elections due at the end of the year in order to turn around the country’s fortunes. Firstly, he will need to implement a peace deal with the armed opposition RENAMO to avoid another outbreak of violence following the vote. Secondly, his government will need to improve its intelligence capability and security response to an intensifying Islamist insurgency in the gas-rich North. Even though militants are targeting rural and remote civilian and security targets in Cabo Delgado province, the prospect of disruption to the nascent natural gas sector is undermining development plans.

Eventual gas revenues will be crucial for the government’s third objective, i.e. ensuring a lasting resolution of the undisclosed debts scandal. Momentum on natural gas development is increasingly motivating debt restructuring and donor reengagement. Mozambique is seeking to extend maturities and share future revenue from offshore gas projects to provide some relief for the budget. A proposed deal with creditors is being motivated by a stronger desire by the Mozambican government to reengage with the IMF, because the state needs billions of dollars in loans to fund its own participation in the gas concessions. Meanwhile, the IMF is considering giving Mozambique a shadow programme, which would be a step towards securing financing from the Fund after the freeze in 2016.

See Mozambique Country Outlook

AFRICA’S BIGGEST POTENTIAL LOSERS IN 2019

While we were arguably wrong to include Ethiopia in our Bottom Five country investment selection last year, the investment climate in DRC, Tanzania, and Zambia did significantly deteriorate as we predicted. Indeed, both Tanzania and Zambia retain their least favourable investment rating for 2019, with further deterioration in their political risk climate likely over the next year. Elsewhere, we are particularly concerned that ongoing economic and political crises in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Gabon may be unsustainable, thus driving heightened risk of political instability, insecurity, and economic collapse. Other countries on our risk indicator watch list for this year include cash-strapped Central African economies and various southern African states that are less likely to benefit from a broader economic recovery elsewhere on the continent.

1) SUDAN

PROTESTS IN SUDAN

Since mid-December, violent protests have erupted in Sudanese cities in scenes of unrest that resemble the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ regional uprisings. What started as an agitation against dire socio-economic conditions, which is attributed to maladministration on the part of President Omar al-Bashir and the governing National Congress Party (NCP), activists have since called for the resignation of the government and the election of a transitional authority. However, President al-Bashir remains steadfast in his pursuance of a fifth term in office at elections 2020 despite mounting resistance both from within the NCP and the opposition.

The lead-up to these elections comes at a time of economic and financial crisis. Depreciated oil prices, in addition to a downturn in production at major refineries, have seen government revenues garnered from its mainstay economic activity plummet. Equally, a decrease in oil production and revenues have left the state with a lack of foreign currency to import fuel and basic commodities, leaving few avenues of respite for a government that is facing an increasingly desperate and agitated population. However, Bashir continues to enjoy the endorsement of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Service which is the guarantor of executive power in Sudan. NISS support may provide a lifeline for al-Bashir through 2019, unless the military or NCP drastically shift their support away from the incumbent. In the meantime, investors will face heightened risks of political instability, widespread insecurity, and non-payment on contracts.

See Sudan Country Outlook

2) TANZANIA

PRESIDENT JOHN MAGUFULI

As a result of President John Magufuli’s self-styled ‘economic war’, investor confidence has collapsed driven by the government’s disputes with some of its largest investors. Some aggrieved investors have gone to arbitration to protect their interests under existing contracts. As a result, foreign investment has dropped by more than 30% since 2015 when President Magufuli was elected. Subdued government revenue collection and delays in securing financing for projects have held back development spending and hurt economic growth. Moreover, a sharp fall in lending to the private sector, prompted by high non-performing loans, point to a continued slowdown in growth. Infrastructure projects are likely to be delayed due to subdued government revenue collection and delays in securing financing.

Meanwhile, the president’s allies in the intelligence services are suppressing any form of political opposition to his government’s nationalist policies. President Magufuli has also stacked the key institutions governing the economy with ideologically-aligned loyalists, thus allowing him to stake out his own political turf, separate to the governing party’s interests. All risk indicators are set to deteriorate even further in 2019, as the impact of the new interventionist policies begins to bite. Already a lack of public spending and private sector concerns over policy uncertainty are curtailing growth. The economy will slow in 2019, although Tanzania will still remain one of the fastest growing economies in Africa over the next few years driven by long-term infrastructure commitments.

See Tanzania Country Outlook

3) ZAMBIA

ZAMBIA COPPER MINING

As President Edgar Lungu focusses on his power extension ambitions, investors are assured long-term policy continuity. However, his government’s authoritarian slide is being replicated in populist economic policy that is rooted in rigid economic nationalism and protectionism. Political in-fighting and legal battles have distracted the government from making the necessary decisions to stimulate the economy and take steps to resolve the critical debt crisis. The role of the IMF lies at the heart of a political power struggle within the PF party-led government. Many Treasury officials have recognised the urgent need for a lending deal with the IMF, yet their plans have been thwarted by presidential advisers who reject the austerity and unpopular subsidy cuts involved in an IMF deal.

Meanwhile, the concerns over Zambia’s debt remain prominent and are frustrating negotiations with the IMF, as well as other creditors including China. The government has maintained a debt-financed infrastructure expansion programme that seeks to run projects in politically important regions of the country. Many recent road, healthcare, and power projects have been politically motivated to ensure local support for Lungu’s power extension ambitions. Such overspending on infrastructure expansion and other politically motivated budgetary items have also triggered allegations of embezzlement and corruption. In the crucial mining sector, a new tax regime is causing smelters to close and motivating mining companies to lay off workers and scrap investment plans. Worse is to come as a harmful new sales tax is due to take effect, while massive VAT rebate arrears are arbitrarily written off.

See Zambia Country Outlook

4) GABON

PRESIDENT ALI BONGO ONDIMBA

A failed military coup at the start of the year is indicative of broad socio-economic and political frustration with Gabon’s leadership, which has been weakened by the suspected incapacitation of its strongman president. Even though the military intervention on 7 January failed for all its intent and purposes, there remains a heightened risk of military and civil unrest as long as there is no clarity on the condition of President Bongo and the government does not initiate constitutional provisions for the presidential succession. Opposition leaders in particular may seek to capitalise on the government’s perceived weakness by mobilising their supporters back to the streets. Given the unresolved coup motivations, the prospect of military unrest including mutinies and further coup attempts remains likely. However, the probability of a successful coup remains moderate.

Another factor that has put pressure on Gabon’s political stability is the country’s ongoing economic and financial crisis. Gabon’s economy slowed to 2.1% in 2016, from 3.9% in 2015, while public debt soared and the current account deficit swelled to more than 10% of GDP from a surplus just two years earlier. Growth has since rebounded to a forecasted 2 percent-plus in 2018, from near-zero growth as a result of suppressed oil prices in recent years. However, a sustainable economic recovery seems unlikely, despite assistance from the IMF. The lack of clarity over Bongo’s condition and the succession process have cast doubt over the commitment to reform criteria as set out by the IMF bailout programme.

See Gabon Country Outlook

5) ZIMBABWE

RIOTS IN HARARE

After an initial period of optimism over Zimbabwe’s political transition over the past year, investors will again face a notable deterioration in risk indicators in 2019. The aftermath of disputed and tainted elections, Zimbabwe’s massive debt burden, and its severe foreign exchange and monetary crisis remain the major obstacles to unlocking substantive flows of private and foreign government finance. Deadly urban protests in January have unearthed the widening political divisions and systemic economic malaise, which the current administration lacks the political clout to resolve. Another military intervention to remove embattled President Emmerson Mnangagwa is increasingly likely this year.

Despite the confidence-inspiring appointment last year of new Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube, he seems out of his depth in the current cash shortage crisis and he lacks the political clout to implement real structural change to the distressed economy. In response to cash shortages, Ncube has pledged to introduce a new currency within 12 months. Such a move will offer little support for businesses struggling to import raw materials and equipment. While the previously forecast 2.4 percent growth rate by the IMF is not out of reach, it will be difficult to attain amid prevailing low-demand, low-investment and high-debt conditions. Debt is particularly concerning given its escalation to over 70 percent of GDP in 2018 and the difficulty associated with clawing back on the figure.

See Zimbabwe Country Outlook

For further comment on these risk forecasts please contact Insight@exxafrica.com

January 4, 2019

EGYPT: TERRORISM IS NOT ‘DYING’ AS COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS ARE WITHDRAWN

Despite recent government claims to the contrary, the threat of terrorism in Egypt has not subsided. The withdrawal of security assets from terrorism-embattled regions is providing Islamist militants a chance to recuperate and recalibrate their armed insurgency.

January 3, 2019

SPECIAL REPORT: OIL PRICE VOLATILITY AND THE IMPACT ON AFRICA IN 2019

Some of Africa’s largest oil producers are in a much stronger position to deal with price volatility than five years ago. Conversely, many African fuel importers are less likely to reap the economic benefits from lower oil prices in 2019.

Read the PDF article here.

Crude oil prices have started 2019 under pressure from rising output and an economic slowdown that could weaken demand. Oil prices fell in 2018 for the first year since 2015. The fourth quarter was marked by severe price volatility. Prices dropped nearly 25 percent in November 2018 alone, the biggest monthly loss in a decade, due to concerns over a possible glut in global supplies.

In terms of supply, record oil production in the world’s largest producers such as the United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia has helped plummet oil prices to their lowest levels since October 2017. Demand-wise, a stronger US dollar has made crude more expensive for global importers, weighing on usage. And concerns over global economic growth and therefore oil demand have created a bear market.

How much will oil cost in 2019?

The key question is whether the oil price will continue to fall in 2019. Just a couple of months ago, major oil trading houses were predicting the return of USD 100 crude, yet oil prices are now standing at half that level. Oil prices began 2019 at USD 54 per barrel for Brent crude and USD 45 for U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures. However, prices are still expected to rise as OPEC-led supply cuts come into effect in January, while US supply growth is expected to slow.

Nevertheless, an average oil price below USD 60 in 2019 now seems a more realistic scenario than a few months ago. Even though most major investment banks have upgraded their forecasts above USD 60 over the past few weeks, the banks agree that unexpected volatility could still throw their expectations way off balance. It is this price volatility that will determine the impact on the world’s economies.

What implications does this scenario have for African oil producing countries and Africa’s largest importers of crude oil? This special report picks five countries of each category to assess their political and economic outlook for 2019.

IMPACT ON MAJOR AFRICAN OIL PRODUCERS

Africa’s largest oil producers are in much better stead to cope with price volatility than in 2014. Nigeria is betting on output increases in 2019 to soften the impact of an oil price drop below the 2019 budget benchmark. Angola will depend on IMF for support as it implements tough oil sector restructuring. Algeria and Egypt are counting on new revenues from shale reserves and natural gas respectively to cushion the blow of any drop in oil prices. However, unreformed oil sectors such as those in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo, would again be in a weaker position to cope with price volatility in 2019, triggering balance of payment shortfalls and political instability with associated unrest risks.

NIGERIA

EGINA NIGERIA OIL PRODUCTION

Output increases are likely to soften the impact of an oil price drop below the 2019 budget benchmark.

Nigeria’s 2019 budget has adopted USD 60 per barrel as its benchmark, which has been criticised as too ambitious by many local economists. The USD 23.6 billion budget was based on a USD 60 benchmark at a time the international oil price was around USD 75. Critics say government projections, especially total revenue projection and expenditure in the budget, may not be realised should volatility continue in the market. The Director-General of Nigeria’s Budget Office has since said that the government might consider lowering the benchmark. Yet such a budget revision seems unlikely given the tense political climate in the lead-up to the February 2019 elections.

Moreover, steady output increases are expected to match any concerns over price volatility. Nigeria has a targeted oil production of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2019, up from 2.1 million bpd in 2018. Crucial to the production ramp-up is the flow of the Egina oil grade, which is expected to add an additional 200,000 barrels per day to Nigeria’s output. The first cargo of the Egina grade will be lifted in February 2019 by French major Total, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Following the February elections, major changes are being lined up for Nigeria’s oil sector, including partial privatisations and asset sell-offs, which should further boost the 2019 budget.

See Nigeria Country Outlook: NIGERIA

ANGOLA

OIL PRODUCTION OFFSHORE ANGOLA

IMF support and non-oil sector asset sell-offs will provide a buffer against further fiscal slippages.

While a bourgeoning oil market shielded the country’s structural deficiencies for decades, these were laid bare by the 2014 oil crash from which the country has yet to recover. For a country that derives approximately 95 percent of its export revenue from oil, the reduced productivity and diminished revenue has left Angola exposed to fiscal slippages and balance of payments shortfalls. Not only do the productivity losses undermine efforts to trim the fiscal deficit down from its high of 7 percent to 3.4 percent – and debt from approximately 60 percent to around 55 percent – but they also weigh on the country’s ability to finance regular expenditures.

Nevertheless, IMF financing is expected to compensate for immediate funding shortfalls in an indeterminate global oil environment. In December 2018, the IMF approved a three-year USD 3.7 billion credit facility. Moreover, broad-based structural reforms in the oil sector have improved productivity. Greater observation of macroeconomic fundamentals and policy anchorage under the IMF programme indicate that market optimism on an already promising Angolan economy is likely to firm up in 2019. State-owned oil company Sonangol plans to exit 52 of more than 100 companies not related to the production or sale of crude, which should further buffer the budget.

See Angola Country Outlook: ANGOLA

ALGERIA

SONATRACH OIL REFINERY IN ALGERIA

Oil sector reform and recent unconventional exploration should cushion against any oil price shocks.

Algeria’s economy has recently benefited from increased gas output, a relative recovery in the Eurozone, and higher oil prices. The country has been trying to boost domestic output and cut imports in an attempt to cope with financial pressures caused by a fall in energy earnings since 2014. Energy earnings have risen in 2018, reducing the country’s trade deficit by more than half. Yet a sudden oil price fall in 2019 could undermine Algeria’s economic recovery and thus raise associated risks of civil unrest and political instability in a crucial election year. However, a number of factors indicate that Algeria is better prepared than previously for any oil price volatility.

State oil company Sonatrach’s chief executive Abdelmoumen Ould has encouraged improved relations with international oil companies, which has advanced foreign investment. Italian oil major Eni has struck a deal to team up with France’s Total to explore oil and gas in Algeria. A new hydrocarbon law will allow for a bigger variety of contracts – in addition to currently used production sharing agreements, concessions and risk service agreements will also become feasible, while new tax remissions are also being considered. Moreover, the recent rebound in prices has allowed Sonatrach to invest in petrochemicals, offshore exploration, and develop Algeria’s heretofore off-limits shale gas deposits.

See Algeria Country Outlook: ALGERIA

EGYPT

ZOHR GAS FIELD PRODUCTION

Gas self-sufficiency and gradual subsidy cuts are likely to mitigate the impact of lower oil revenues.

Egypt has budgeted its 2018/2019 finances assuming oil prices at USD 67 a barrel, which no longer seems realistic under the current climate of price volatility. The IMF has provided a USD 12 billion credit facility, yet disbursements will depend on continued progress on implementing economic reforms, such as subsidy cuts and tax hikes. The main threat to the government lies in Egypt’s systemic economic imbalances, austerity policies, and subsequent risks of civil unrest. To mitigate unrest risks the government is delaying some subsidy cuts and increasing interest rates to calm consumer price inflation.

In 2018, Egypt became self-sufficient in liquefied natural gas (LNG), thus shoring up its budget by saving around USD 2 billion a year from natural gas imports. The country continues to depend on imports for gasoline and diesel, although lower oil prices would mean that the government will be spending less on fuel subsidies this fiscal year through June 2019, when it plans to have phased out the support for fuel prices. The monthly import bill for fuel and natural gas has declined to about USD 550 million during the current fiscal year compared to an average of USD 700 million previously. The lower import bill will underpin Egypt’s continued economic recovery through 2019, even if oil price volatility continues.

See Egypt Country Outlook: EGYPT

SUDAN & SOUTH SUDAN

SOUTH SUDAN UNITY OIL FIELD

While South Sudan is attracting fresh oil sector investment, dependency on Sudan undercuts stability.

South Sudan’s oil production remains dependent on Sudan’s export terminals, underscoring the interlinkages between the two countries’ oil sectors. South Sudan is targeting oil output of 200,000 bpd, from a current 155,000 barrels, after the restarting of the country’s northern Unity field in December 2018. The country is also attracting fresh foreign investment from new and traditional sources as its fragile peace process begins to take hold. However, dependence on Sudan undercuts some of these recent gains. Disruptions in oil production, disputes over oil revenue sharing, and lower oil prices have had a negative effect on the economies of both Sudan and South Sudan.

Sudan is already facing an economic and financial crisis. Depreciated oil prices, in addition to a downturn in production at its major refineries, have seen government revenues garnered from its mainstay economic activity plummet. Equally, a decrease in oil production and revenues have left the state with a lack of foreign currency to import fuel and basic commodities, leaving few avenues of respite for a government that is facing an increasingly desperate and agitated population. Violent protests have raged over December in large parts of the country, which would be further aggravated in case of even lower oil prices in 2019.

See Sudan and South Sudan Country Outlook: SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN

IMPACT ON MAJOR AFRICAN FUEL IMPORTERS

Unreformed African economies that depend on fuel imports will see negligible benefit from lower oil prices in 2019, due to currency volatility, entrenched external imbalances, and rising debt concerns. Countries like South Africa will not see an immediate economic recovery as fuel prices drop, while Kenya’s trade deficit may only be narrowed once a pipeline for crude oil exports is complete. Ethiopia is in a better position in 2019 to pay its fuel import bill than last year, despite ongoing hard currency shortages. Other large fuel importers like Morocco will need to depend on export growth to balance the import bill, even if international oil prices fall.

SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICAN MOTORISTS

A falling import bill is insufficient to turn around the struggling economy, as debt concerns mount.

Falling international oil prices have recently outweighed the impact of the weakening rand. The country’s department of energy has already announced a sharp drop in fuel prices for January 2019 after surging to a record high in October 2018. This will boost the governing ANC party’s re-election chances towards the middle of the year, while also offering some much-needed budgetary relief. It should also boost South Africa’s chances of retaining its debt assets within Citi Group’s prestigious World Government Bond Index (WGBI) and with that the trajectory of South Africa’s investment inflows.

However, a falling import bill is unlikely to spur a broader economic upswing. Growth projections for 2018 have already been revised downwards from 1.5 percent to 0.7 percent. Fiscal consolidation is similarly off the mark. Contrary to expectations, the deficit is forecast to widen to 4 percent and 4.2 percent in 2019/20, while debt will peak at a high of 59.6 percent a year later than expected in 2023/2024. Finance Minister Tito Mboweni has warned that should the country’s debt reach the 60 percent mark, it would be forced to turn to the IMF for assistance. Associated servicing costs are also scheduled to escalate from the current 13.9 percent to 15.1 of revenue by 2020/21, adding further pressure to the country’s limited fiscus.

See South Africa Country Outlook: SOUTH AFRICA

KENYA

KENYA PETROL STATION

Long term weakening of Kenya’s external position will not be reversed by lower oil prices in 2019.

In June 2018, Kenya began its first ever crude oil exports from the northern Turkana region. However, until a planned pipeline allows for larger-scale commercial oil exports, Kenya will not be able to offset its sizable fuel import bill with crude exports. For most of 2018, Kenya’s oil import bill has eaten into the country’s export earnings, exerting pressure on the local currency. Kenya’s deteriorating external position is underlined further by the price stability in its soft commodity export, despite remarkable volatility in the oil price. The amount of money spent by Kenya on oil has risen by 70 per cent from 2016 to 2018, while exports increased by six per cent.

The recent fall in crude oil price bodes well for Kenya’s inflation outlook and eases the pressure on the shilling. Petroleum products account for about 16 percent of Kenya’s import bill, and thus are a significant driver of dollar demand in the domestic market. The Central Bank of Kenya believes overall inflation will remain within the target range in the near term. However, Kenya’s lack of refining capacity remains a serious drag on the budget – the country closed its only refinery in 2013. Lower fuel prices will however make the recent imposition of a petroleum tax more palatable, despite heavy opposition the levy was approved in October.

See Kenya Country Outlook: KENYA

ZAMBIA

LUSAKA PETROL DEPOT

A depreciating local currency counter-acts lower oil prices with little benefit to deficit reduction.

Despite lower oil prices, Zambia’s Energy Regulations Board has planned no adjustment of fuel prices. This is due to the depreciation of the kwacha currency, which has left the country’s import bill effectively unchanged. In November, Zambia’s total fuel import bill stood at USD 152 million. During the period of importation, the kwacha was still depreciating while international oil prices were still relatively high. Yet the prospect of lower fuel prices remains remote even if the kwacha stabilises and the oil prices remain relatively low as Zambia’s government implements austerity measures for deficit reduction.

Disconcertingly, with the kwacha rapidly ceding to the USD and the outlook on the mainstay copper industry appearing highly speculative there is the feeling that the worst is yet to come for the externally vulnerable market. Indeed, further bullishness from the US Federal Reserve Bank or tariffs on copper could see the kwacha depreciate more, revenue streams dry-up, and foreign short-term payment requirements tread further into default territory as portended by recent ratings downgrades. A lower fuel import bill might alleviate some budgetary pressure, but is highly unlikely to reverse Zambia’s economic decline.

See Zambia Country Outlook: ZAMBIA

ETHIOPIA

PORT OF DJIBOUTI

Ongoing economic reforms and a stabilising currency mitigate risk of non-payment on fuel imports.

Landlocked Ethiopia imports all of its petroleum products, which are critical for transportation, industrial, and household uses. The Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Enterprise (EPSE) therefore plays a crucial strategic role for the economy. Ethiopian fuel imports have been growing at a rate of 10 percent every year and now amount to three million metric tons valued at over USD 3 billion. Fuel imports are so important to Ethiopia that it continues to seek greater diversification of supply. Capacity limitations at the Djibouti oil terminal have prompted the Ethiopian government to start planning to build an oil terminal at the Port of Djibouti. The Ethiopian government, which fully funds EPSE’s import bill, is unlikely to risk any disruption to the strategically important fuel supply.

Ongoing hard currency shortages, rising inflation, and below target exports are key concerns at a time of continued fiscal expansion and dwindling economic momentum. This has raised concerns over non-payment of Ethiopia’s fuel import bill. However, lower oil prices, a stabilising currency, broad-based economic reforms indicate an improved balance of payments position for 2019. Moreover, syndicated credit facilities with multilateral participation are being prioritised for payment by the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia is also using its expanding goodwill to acquire condition-free multilateral funding, which should further ensure timely payment on the country’s fuel imports.

See Ethiopia Country Outlook: ETHIOPIA

MOROCCO

TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE IN MOROCCO

Liberalisation has not brought lower fuel costs, yet longer term diversification plans are underway.

The deregulation of fuel costs has backfired on the Moroccan government amid falling oil prices in the international market. The Moroccan government liberalised fuel prices in December 2015, leaving them to be determined by market forces. However, the country’s sole oil refinery ceased operations in 2015. Additionally, high taxes keep the fuel price artificially high. Taxes represent around 46 percent of the final price of the litre of fuel in Morocco. Subsequently, consumers have been prevented from taking advantage of the benefits of liberalisation.

Over the past few months transportation workers have gone on strike to protest soaring fuel prices, which disrupted fruit and vegetable supplies, forcing an increase in food prices. The last time oil prices crashed in 2014, Morocco’s government took advantage to wean its economy off fuel subsidies. Yet, incomplete sector liberalisation have not allowed Morocco to reap the benefits of lower oil prices. Longer term plans are being laid out to reduce Morocco’s dependence on foreign oil and coal. The government is inviting bids for a liquefied natural gas project in Jorf Lasfar worth USD 4.5 billion. Meanwhile, booming exports of vehicles, phosphates, aeronautics, and agricultural products are set to underpin export growth in 2019. Morocco’s account deficit is set to shrink to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2018 and 2.2 percent in 2019, down from 3.6 percent in 2017.

See Morocco Country Outlook: MOROCCO

For any questions about this report or any further information regarding EXX Africa Insight risk intelligence, please email Insight@exxafrica.com

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