State-owned enterprises in Africa have a notorious reputation for being mismanaged and for repeatedly requiring financial bailouts. EXX Africa unpacks this notion by looking at some of the best and worst-performing entities across the continent. Our analysis spans from examples in Morocco, Ghana, and Ethiopia to Zambia and South Africa.
Two months out from elections, Mozambique’s government has secured a peace deal with the armed opposition and agreed on debt restructuring with most of its creditors. These are crucial steppingstones as the country seeks massive gas-related investment inflows and a potential new IMF programme. However, an intensifying Islamist insurgency, suspected electoral manipulation, and lack of progress on bringing perpetrators of the hidden loans scandal to account remain key obstacles towards longer term stability.
As concerns over the impact of a global trade war on African economies mount and the continent faces a looming debt crisis, the recent IMF bailout of Brazzaville may offer some indications on how the Fund is preparing to step in as lender of last resort in other debt-burdened or cash-strapped countries while softening its conditionalities in the face of competing Chinese loans.
The incoming government is not expected to deviate from the strong naira and directed credit policy, although there is a better chance of widespread oil sector reform being implemented to plug Nigeria’s gaping budget deficit. There is no indication that the new government will act fast to implement measures for continental free trade or deal with the country’s myriad security crises.
EXX Africa explores Russia’s growing influence in Africa. We look at the drivers of this foreign policy shift, the locations of interest, and the implications for traditional players across the continent.
At the end of this year, in October 2019, Russia will host its very first Russia-Africa Summit, which will bring together more than 50 African leaders in Sochi. While Russian influence across the continent is nothing new, as the former Soviet Union enjoyed extensive support among many African nations throughout the Cold War, there has been a notable shift in its focus over the past half-decade. We explore the nature of this shift and the strategic objectives behind Russia’s engagements with select countries. We further look at how Russia fares against other global powers in this latest ‘scramble’.
Russian influence across the continent is not unprecedented. From 1960 until the end of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union supported liberation movements in Algeria, Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Morocco and South Africa, among others. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, these relations faded. Indeed, throughout the next decade, Africa experienced a so-called ‘third wave of democratisation’ during which Vladimir Putin showed limited interest in Africa.
This outlook changed significantly after 2014. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, relations with the West reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The US and EU responded to Russian expansionist policies in Eastern Europe by implementing sanctions against the regime, while both sides of the dispute engaged in a military build-up.
In response to actions from the West, Russia amended its foreign policy to establish strategic ties outside of the West and to insulate its economy against ongoing sanctions. As a part of this, Russia established new economic and security ties with South Asia, the Middle East, South America and indeed, Africa.
The Africa pivot
According to leaked documents obtained by the Dossier Centre, a London-based investigative unit, Russia’s pivot towards the continent typically involves a deal in which it offers some level of political or security support to African leaders in return for various concessions, such as in mining, oil and gas, arms or infrastructure contracts. Through these deals, Russia also establishes close personal ties with various heads of state and upcoming leaders, ensuring longevity to its plan.
The man reportedly driving this shift to Africa is known as Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman and close ally of Putin who is believed to be a funder of Wagner Group: a private military contractor with a presence in Africa. According to the leaked documents, Prigozhin has identified various countries with which Russia is seeking to bolster relations through political and economic ties, police training, media and humanitarian projects, and “rivalry with France”. Each country is ranked out of five in terms of priority with five being the highest level, and one the lowest.
The following countries are identified as part of this shift, according to the leaked documents:
― Rank five: Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and Madagascar
― Rank four: Libya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa
― Rank three: South Sudan
― Rank two: the DRC, Chad and Zambia
― Countries cited where Russia “plans to work”: Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and Mali
― Countries cited “where cooperation is possible”: Ethiopia
― Countries cited as “traditionally supportive”: Egypt
We explore the nature of these relations and the impact on Western interests in some of these countries of interest.
Central African Republic – Rank Five
Russian influence in the CAR – a former French colony – failed to garner much attention until July 2018 when it was reported that three Russian journalists had been killed around 180km from the capital, Bangui, while on an assignment focused on investigating the activities of Wagner Group in the country. By the end of the year, Russia’s involvement had made its way into a UN Experts Report.
In the midst of a protracted armed conflict that had been ongoing since 2013, it emerged that President Faustin-Archange Touadéra sought out Russian assistance on the side-lines of a UN General Assembly meeting in 2017 to help bring about peace and get armed groups around the negotiating table. Russia responded by providing the national army with training and equipment and provided the president with security advice and personal protection.
To date, this has included: the free delivery of thousands of smalls arms to equip local law enforcement and two local battalions totalling 1,300 men; the deployment of Valery Zakharov (a former member of Russian intelligence services) as the top security advisor to Touadéra; the deployment of over 170 servicemen to train local security services; the deployment of an additional 30 servicemen to join the local UN peacekeeping mission; and plans to open a local office in the country.
Rich in natural resources – such as gold, diamonds and uranium – Russia is suspected to be shoring up support with Touadéra to secure these contracts. Indeed, reports have emerged of the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries guarding valuable gold and diamond mining operations in the country. This includes the large Ndassima gold mine that is alleged to have been taken over by Russian interests funnelled through a locally registered company known as Lobaye Invest. Ndassima was previously owned by a Canadian company before falling into the hands of Seleka rebels.
In addition to winning contracts in the extractives sector, the leaked documents further reveal that Russia plans to “replace national assembly representatives and [the] foreign minister who are orientated towards France” and “own [a] radio station and two print publications”. These objectives were partially achieved with the establishment of a new government this year and the opening of Radio Lengo Songo, which is funded by Lobaye Invest and the Russian embassy, last year.
France’s response to Russian meddling in its former colony has been vociferous. Following the free delivery of arms to the CAR the French Defence Minister noted, “I am not sure that this presence and the actions deployed by Moscow… help to stabilize the country”. In November 2018, in a show of force, France announced that it would be delivering its own arms to the CAR as well as aid to the value of USD 27.4 million.
South Africa – Rank Four
Ranked as a level four, recent Russian interests in South Africa have revolved around entering into political consultations with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party ahead of the May 2019 general elections, monitoring of public-political social processes, and creating a new media – according to the leaked documents. This plan was formed as part of Putin’s strategy to support incumbents in office and to work against “pro-Western” parties and movements.
Just prior to the elections in May, in which doubt began to emerge as to whether the ANC would garner above 50 percent of the vote, a local investigation by the Daily Maverick revealed that these plans were underway. It emerged that entities linked to Prigozhin had devised to “create a disinformation campaign that favoured the ANC and put out a propaganda action against the opposition DA [Democratic Alliance] and EFF [Economic Freedom Fighters].” As a part of this strategy, Russia reportedly deployed a small team of political analysts to South Africa to work within a research outfit that would influence public rhetoric, degenerate and disseminate video content, coordinate with a “loyal pool of journalists” and produce “pro-ANC videos”.
While subsequent reports revealed that the initiative was not very effective and that there was no disinformation campaign, the attempt nevertheless points to the intent my Russia to meddle in African politics to ensure a favourable outcome.
Moreover, the investigation by the Daily Maverick further pointed to various business interests in South Africa that Russia planned to pursue under the leadership of Prigozhin. These include the supply of ammunitions and short-barrelled weapons to a South African company, the acquisition of stakes in a local industrial packaging company and various infrastructure projects, particularly in Johannesburg.
Beyond South Africa, the report revealed interests in Zimbabwe (a rank four country), particularly under the new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Here, Russia is looking to secure access to gold mining, tantalite, copper and chromium deposits – it is already developing one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum group metals – and the establishment of a military industrial complex.
South Sudan – Rank Three
Russia’s relationship with South Sudan cannot be explored without acknowledging the close ties it enjoys with its neighbour, Sudan (a rank five country). Putin had long enjoyed a close relationship with former Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir who reportedly even offered Russia a naval base at the Red Sea in return for support for his government, particularly in light of mounting protests. While Al Bashir was eventually removed in 2019, Putin still enjoys relations with the transitional military council in power and will likely play an active role in the 2020 elections.
South Sudan is crucial to Sudan, and therefore Russia. While Sudan lost 75 percent of its proven oil reserves after South Sudan gained independence in 2011, it nevertheless retains the infrastructure required to bring South Sudan’s oil to market and, as such, continued flow between the two states is necessary. As South Sudan has looked to open up its hydrocarbons sector to potential investors in light of its peace deal in 2018, Russia has emerged as a top contender.
In late 2018, a delegation from South Sudan along with officials from the government-owned Nile Petroleum Company travelled to Russia to a sign an MoU with a Russian oil company, Zarubezhneft, to explore some of its blocks open for licensing. The officials also signed two other MoUs with Russian oil producer, Gazprom Neft and energy company, Rosneft, to develop a geological map of the country’s minerals. In addition to these oil exploration deals, Russia is also reportedly working to establish a refinery for South Sudanese oil back in Sudan.
Furthermore, it is alleged that as Russia’s commercial relationship with South Sudan continues to expand, Russia may soon shift to promoting its military interests in the country. In this scenario, much like in the CAR, its security forces are expected to be deployed to guard Russian interests – such as oil blocks – and train local forces.
Democratic Republic of Congo – Rank Two
Russia has recently hedged its bets by backing newly-elected President Félix Tshisekedi following the controversial general elections that took place at the end of 2018. While many Western countries – including France and Belgium – supported opposition concerns that Tshisekedi had struck a deal with former President Joseph Kabila ahead of the vote, Russia not only sided with the new president but – along with China and South Africa – also blocked the UN from taking any meaningful action regarding the vote.
This action is unsurprising given that Russia had engaged in discussions with Kabila and his supporters about reviving a 1999 agreement on military cooperation in 2018, and had reportedly cultivated a relationship with Tshisekedi ahead of the vote. Rich in natural resources, Russia is likely looking to gain access to new concessions whilst promoting an anti-Western ideology in the country – a stance previously undertaken by Kabila and likely to be pursued under Tshisekedi.
While Russian engagement with Africa has certainly grown, with trade and investment climbing by 185 percent between 2005 and 2015, it lags behind the initiatives of other major powers, such the US, the EU, and China. Each one of these countries has established economic and military ties across the continent and has their own programmes in this regard.
While US investment in Africa has barely risen since 2010, in June 2019, it launched a new Prosper Africa policy to reverse this trend and, indeed, counter both Chinese and Russian influence across the continent. The US also has a vast military presence in Africa, which includes 34 sites with high concentrations in the north, west and the Horn of Africa.
The EU and Africa also have extensive ties. Economically, 41 African states have signed Economic Partnership Agreements with the bloc and there is even talk of a continent-to-continent free trade agreement. Military, France has a large presence across the continent, particularly in the Sahel and the Maghreb. As part of Operation Barkhane alone, France has deployed over 3,000 personnel to the region in its largest overseas operation.
Lastly, China remains the top contender (economically speaking) with it being the continent’s leading trading partner. The total volume of two-way trade between China in Africa currently exceeds USD 200 billion while investment from China to Africa doubled between 2010 and 2016. As a show of further commitment to the continent, in September 2018, President Xi Jinping pledged an additional USD 60 billion in broad and diverse financing. Its key focus in this regard has been its Belt and Road Initiative.
In comparison to these other actors, Russian influence in Africa appears relatively weak and poses a limited threat to more established players. However, instead of competing head to head in terms of military or economic might, Russia is likely playing a more subtle game in which it establishes itself in less popular destinations, sows seeds of discontent with the West, helps up prop up long-term leaders and secures access to natural resources.
SEE COUNTRY OUTLOOK: SOUTH-AFRICA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SOUTH-SUDAN, SUDAN, MADAGASCAR, CHAD, ZAMBIA, GUINEA, UGANDA, EQUATORIAL-GUINEA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, ETHIOPIA, EGYPT, MALI, LIBYA, ZIMBABWE
The recent cancellation of high-profile Chinese infrastructure projects in Tanzania and Kenya does not indicate a shift in attitude towards investment from China. Instead, East African governments are increasingly integrating infrastructure investment options into a more competitive landscape that seeks to bridge the massive annual financing gap. However, accomplishing sustained economic growth, meeting revenue collection targets, and achieving positive indicators will be required to balance growing debt levels and record fiscal expansionism. This may be undermined by any manipulation of statistics in some East African countries.
While East African states face major security challenges from several civil wars, sporadic political upheavals, and the persistent threat of violent extremism, regional states remain prime destinations for tourism and business travel. We assess the risk posed by criminal activity to foreign nationals visiting and living in the region’s urban centres and tourism destinations.
A lack of demand for intra-regional formal trade in West Africa may prove the most serious challenge for the single currency’s eventual launch and success. Unlike the Eurozone in the 1990s, West African economies are geared towards exporting to western or Asian markets, rather than its neighbours. Few West African countries are likely to meet all currency convergence criteria over the next year, while most CFA countries will be reluctant to replace their stable monetary regime with the messy managed float of the Nigerian naira.
Over the past year, the rapid encroachment of Sahel-based Islamist militant groups on the borders of West African coastal states has prompted widespread concern that previously unaffected locales are now under threat. Based on the geographic dispersal of regional militant actors and their current capabilities and intent, EXX Africa assesses the possible scenarios and likely locations for a terrorist attack in these coastal hubs.
Since 2015, a rapid expansion of Islamist militant activity in West Africa and the Sahel has corresponded with an unprecedented level of violence across the region. In particular, high-impact terrorist attacks in major urban centres in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire have become more frequent, pointing to both an increased capability and reach on the part of regional militant organisations. As the violence encroaches on the borders of West African coastal states, concerns abound that the terrorist threat may spill-over into these previously unaffected locales.
The Primary Threat Actors
Who they are and where they operate
With the exception of Nigeria, no militant groups have demonstrated a significant operational presence in West African coastal states. However, since 2015, the number and geographic distribution of Islamist militant groups operating in West Africa and the Sahel region have increased at a rapid pace, extending the risk to these regions.
The primary hub of militant activity in the Sahel stretches from north-eastern Mali and western Niger, to south-eastern Burkina Faso, encompassing the border areas between the three states. Groups operating here include the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and an Islamist militant coalition, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). JNIM includes several regional groups, including Ansar Dine, the Sahara-based branch of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Mourabitoun (See MALI: UNRELENTING SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN THE SAHEL).
Despite numerous international counter-terrorism efforts, militants in the Sahel have intensified their activities over the past five years. The number of militancy-related violent incidents across the region reached a peak in 2018, when 465 incidents were recorded, compared to 90 in 2016. In addition, French and UN military operations in Mali have pushed many militants beyond their established areas of operation in the north-east of the country, into previously unaffected areas. For instance, 2018 saw a surge of militant attacks connected to both JNIM and ISGS in south-eastern Burkina Faso, in close proximity to the country’s borders with Ghana, Benin, and Togo (See BURKINA FASO: COUNTERING THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIST MILITANCY).
A second regional hub of militant activity is in north-eastern Nigeria, and the border areas between Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The primary groups operating in this region are Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram and ISWAP’s activities remain focused on north-eastern Nigeria and across its border, where they are conducting an insurgency against the Nigerian military. However, Boko Haram has previously threatened to enter into northern Benin through its porous north-eastern border with Nigeria although thus far there have been no incidents in Benin associated with the group (See SPECIAL REPORT: THE RETURN OF BOKO HARAM IN AND BEYOND NIGERIA?).
Militant groups operating in West Africa and the Sahel have varying degrees of capability. The majority of attacks orchestrated by these groups occur in outlying areas where they either conduct direct assaults on villages and pastoral camps during which they kill high numbers of civilians and loot as many goods as possible, or conduct raids or improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against army positions and patrols.
However, several groups have also demonstrated the capability to conduct complex coordinated assaults in regional urban hubs. For example, on 2 March 2018 JNIM conducted an attack in Ougoudougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, simultaneously targeting the Burkinabe national army headquarters, the French Embassy, and the French Institute, killing 30 people. Such attacks have included the use of suicide vests and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) (See BURKINA FASO: SIDELINED SECURITY SERVICES SEEK COLLABORATION WITH ARMED MILITANTS).
This increase in the geographic spread, as well as the volume and intensity of violence in the past two years, is in large part a product of greater cooperation and coordination between regional militant groups which has facilitated the formation of militant coalitions. In addition, the capability of militant groups to conduct operations across national borders has been bolstered through close connections to regional criminal activity, including the smuggling of arms and ammunition.
Attacks in West African urban centres remain driven in large part by resistance to foreign military intervention in Mali, especially ongoing French counter-terrorism operations. Islamist groups in the Sahel have also proclaimed their intent to carry out attacks on targets linked to those countries participating in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This includes most states in the West Africa and the Sahel region, as well as a high number of Western countries. Correspondingly, the vast majority of militant attacks across the region have targeted international and local forces engaged in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations.
However, attacks in major urban centres have overwhelmingly targeted sites associated with the presence of high numbers of Western civilians, such as popular restaurants and hotels, as well as embassies. Areas where French nationals routinely congregate, including French government and military facilities, are especially likely to be targeted in such attacks. However, all Westerners are ostensibly under threat, as indicated by previous attacks on sites where large numbers of foreign nationals from a variety of Western states are present. While no attacks have yet taken place in West Africa against large malls or shopping complexes, these are also likely to constitute primary targets due to the typically high number of Western expats frequenting such locations.
Anatomy of a militant attack
Taking into account the historical modus operandi of militant groups in West Africa, as well as their current capabilities, the most likely form of attack in any of the large urban centres in West African coastal states is an assault by multiple gunmen on a prominent restaurant, hotel, foreign embassy, beach resort, or shopping complex.
Most previous attacks have involved groups of between two and ten attackers armed with assault rifles and wearing suicide vests. In some cases, assailants wore the official uniforms of state security forces, both delaying the reaction of victims in the target area, as well as complicating efforts by first responders to positively identify threats. As demonstrated in Burkina Faso in March 2018, such an attack may also consist of multiple groups of gunmen targeting disparate locations simultaneously.
In a number of major attacks in urban centres in Mali and Burkina Faso, militants have also employed IEDs/VBIEDs as precursors to an assault by multiple gunmen. In some instances, IEDs/VBIEDs employed against secondary targets have also been used to draw the attention of security forces and emergency services away from the primary site of an assault, increasing the overall lethality of an attack. However, with limited presence in the West African coastal states, militants are less likely to be able to manufacture or transport VBIEDs as easily as in the Sahel.
Top Ten West African Cities at Risk
|2||San Pedro||Cote d’Ivoire|
(1) Abidjan and (2) San Pedro (Côte d’Ivoire)
One previous terrorist attack has been recorded in Cote d’Ivoire: On 13 March 2016, three gunmen carried out an attack on a beach hotel in Grande-Bassam (30km east of Abidjan), killing 19 people (See AL-QAEDA ATTACKS COTE D’IVOIRE). AQIM and Al Mourabitoun jointly claimed responsibility for the attack. Côte d’Ivoire has since increased internal security measures in urban centres, including a greater police presence around vulnerable sites such as prominent hotels. Nonetheless, due to Côte d’Ivoire’s role as a close security partner of France and host to a French military base, militant groups retain a high intent to target the country. Indicative of this, on 8 November 2018, Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar Dine, called for attacks against Côte d’Ivoire specifically. One month later, on 6 December 2018, security forces in Mali reportedly apprehended a militant cell which was planning to conduct an attack in Côte d’Ivoire, targeting New Year’s celebrations (See COTE D’IVOIRE: NEW YEAR’S EVE TERROR PLOT INDICATES RISING THREAT OF JIHADISM).
(3) Cotonou and (4) Porto Novo (Benin)
Benin shares over 2,000km with four countries, three of which (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria) host the above militant groups. In particular, reports of cross-border militant activity in southern Burkina Faso have increased over the past two years, with local residents in northern Benin alleging that Islamist fighters have visited their communities periodically. In early 2019, several incidents indicated a possible escalation of militant activity in the border region. Notably, in May 2019, two French tourists were kidnapped in the Pendjari National Park in northern Benin. While no group claimed responsibility, the victims were rescued days later in a French military operation in northern Burkina Faso, suggesting that militants were involved (See BENIN: POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND ISLAMIST MILITANCY WILL NOT DERAIL ECONOMIC SUCCESS). In addition, there is some evidence that terrorist cells are present in Benin; in May 2018, 42 people were arrested during counter-terrorism operations. Militant intent to target the coastal country is likely to stem from Benin’s contribution to the UN MINUSMA operation in Mali/Burkina Faso. Benin was also one of the countries specifically mentioned in Ag Ghali’s video last year.
(5) Lomé (Togo)
As with Benin, over the past year Togo has seen an increasing amount of militant activity on the country’s northern border with Burkina Faso. In April 2018, authorities reported that more than 20 militants had entered the country from Burkina Faso, bringing with them notable sums of cash. Thereafter, in response to the growing threat on their borders, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana conducted a joint security operation in May 2018 in which over 200 people were arrested, many of which on terrorism charges. Additionally, in February 2019, five people, including a Spanish priest, were reportedly killed by Islamist militants during two separate attacks on the border between Togo and Burkina Faso. Togo is also a major contributor to the UN MINUSMA operation in Mali/Burkina Faso, driving intent to target the country. The security response to the threat by the government has focused on increasing military operations in the porous border area, which is likely to have a limited impact on mitigating the risk of an attack in Lomé.
(6) Dakar and (7) St. Louis (Senegal)
Senegal remains one of the foremost contributors to the UN MINUSMA operation in Mali/Burkina Faso, and as such constitutes a potential target for regional militant organisations. Senegal is also a military partner to France and hosts a French military presence at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport in Dakar. Direct intent to target the state is also evident, as Senegal was one of the countries mentioned in Ag Ghali’s video last year. Militant cells have been previously dismantled in both St. Louis and Dakar, both of which host high numbers of Western expatriates. Most recently, in July 2018 a Senegalese court sentenced 14 people to prison on charges of belonging to AQIM and Boko Haram. However, since 2016 Senegal has significantly bolstered security measures in major urban centres, including the provision of additional protection for international airports, prominent hotels, and popular tourist sites. While these measures have not been applied consistently, it is likely that they will constrain the ability of militants to carry out attacks in either city (See TERROR THREAT IN DAKAR, SENEGAL).
(8) Accra and (9) Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana)
As with Benin and Togo, Ghana’s northern border is under threat from militants operating in southern Burkina Faso. Over the past year, Ghanaian security forces have implemented measures to address possible threats, including joint border security operations with neighbouring countries and renewed counter-terrorism training for the Ghanaian police. However, in May 2018, 13 people were arrested in Ghana on terrorism charges, suggesting that militant networks are already operating within the country. Both Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi host a high number of Western tourists and residents, providing a range of target opportunities for militant groups. Intent to target Ghana derives primarily from the country’s ongoing contribution to the UN MINUSMA operation in Mali/Burkina Faso. The country was also specifically named in Ag Ghali’s video last year (See GHANA: TERRORISM THREAT RESURFACES AS ISLAMIST MILITANCY GAINS A FOOTHOLD). The port of Tema has also faced numerous attack scares over the past year, although the viability of such reports has often been questionable and more likely derived from organised crime (See GHANA: SUSPECTED TERRORISM SCARE TO DRIVE DISRUPTION IN TEMA PORT AREA).
(10) Lagos (Nigeria)
While militant activity has focused on the north-east of the country, Boko Haram’s presence extends to Nigeria’s commercial capital. Since 2015, Nigerian security forces have reported multiple police raids targeting Boko Haram militants in the city. Most recently, in December 2018 a prominent Boko Haram leader reportedly responsible for planning several major bombings in the capital, Abuja, was arrested in Lagos. Nonetheless, only one militant attack has taken place in Lagos in the past five years, and it remains likely that Boko Haram will continue to focus the bulk of its efforts further inland and across the border into Niger and Chad. Attacks targeting Western foreign nationals are more likely to take place in Abuja, where multiple IED/VBIED attacks have taken place since 2011 (See NIGERIA: ISLAMIST MILITANTS PREPARE NEW OFFENSIVE TO CAPTURE TERRITORY IN NORTHEAST).
The governments of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are moving closer to cocoa market consolidation and are due to introduce a relatively modest minimum floor price for producers to alleviate widespread poverty among farmers. The countries have threatened to suspend forward sales until the plan is put in place. However, there remain challenges to implementation including lack of liquidity. The strategy could also backfire by creating a supply glut and causing a structural weakness in the cocoa market, motivating divestment from West Africa to other cocoa-producing regions.
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